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INTRODUCTION

The prime objective of scholars of International Relations is to find
consistent answers to the question of order in the realm of relations among multiple
actors in the world’s political and economic system. In other words, academics of this
field attempt to develop theories, models, and hypotheses that can best describe and
explain past, present, and future patterns of international relations. In this sense, this
thesis will not be different from any other analytical research with respect to its
traditional main purpose.
However, it will probably differ with regard to its general interdisciplinary
approach that is best exemplified by the theoretical framework and methodology chosen
to achieve its goal and support its key argument. In fact, underlying the thesis is the
conscious decision to combine the discipline of International Relations with International
Political Economy, as it is maintained that there is a reciprocal interdependence
relationship between the political and economic dimensions of matters. It is asserted that
in some cases political views, while in some other instances economic reasoning
influence choices of actors at the international level. However, given the rise of economic
and financial Globalization it is assumed that the economic aspect within issues has
gained increasing importance for an accurate analysis of world politics. As associate
professor at the American University in Cairo, Dr. Ibrahim El Nur affirms that such an
approach can be extremely insightful, as it allows drawing a clear connection line
between international relations and the economic dimension that lies underneath them
and often represents the prime cause of actions by actors in the international system.
Furthermore, El Nur claims that this combination of disciplines and theories is worth
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exploring, as issues from diverse realms are becoming progressively more interconnected
in the globalized era (El Nur, 2007 interview).
Since the end of the Second World War there has been a nearly universal
trend toward regionalism, best represented by the European and Southeast Asian cases,
and the rise of more than one hundred other regional agreements. This tendency,
however, has experienced a particularly steep increase since the 1980s due to significant
political and economic developments. The rise of economic and more importantly
financial globalization fostered by impressive technological progress is regarded as one
of the key factors correlated to this new wave of regionalism. Such advancements have
utterly changed the whole realm of international relations and raised a number of
questions regarding governance, negative effects of increased financial instability and
possible responses by states to such deep and fast changes (Gilpin, 2000 pp. 40-41).
Financial instability and governance as the area of study in International
Relations represent the general topic of the thesis. The first concept is a possible
consequence of an uncontrolled, precipitate and rushed process of globalization. At the
same time, the second refers to the challenge posed by the former with regard to the
problem of how to deal with it effectively in order to reduce the risks of financial
instability that threaten the economic and thus political and social stability of a country or
region. In this context, the former president of the World Bank, James, D. Wolfensohn,
made the following public statement in August 1999:
This report (World Development Report 1999/2000) seeks neither to praise
nor to condemn globalization and localization. Rather it recognizes them as
forces that bring new opportunities, but also raise new or greater challenges
in terms of economic and political stability” (Wolfensohn 1999 cited in Kim,
2000 p. 1).
By the same token, Joseph Stiglitz, 2001 Nobel Laureate in economics, asserts in an
internet-based interview that the high number and frequency of financial crises occurred
in the last twenty years are to be observed from a broader perspective. They indicate that
2

such financial problems are not isolated; on the contrary, these can be thought of as part
of an unstable systemic architecture (Stiglitz, 2007 interview).
More specifically, an analysis of how financial crises may be correlated to
the distribution of power among the main actors and their attitude toward regional
integration will be conducted. In this context, regionalism in terms of trade unions and, at
a higher level, monetary unions will be examined as linked to the question of governance
of financial instability by the means of the case study of the European Union, i.e. EU,
and the Association of South East Asian Nations, i.e. ASEAN. Moreover, attention will
be dedicated to the evaluation of future developments regarding the collocation and
influence of these regional organizations in the international system and the general trend
towards deeper regional economic integration. In this context, special consideration will
be given to the analysis of the possible impact of an eventual financial crisis of the
United States of America on the power relations among the various players in the
international arena with particular regard to regional organizations.
The work will be divided into two main parts: the first part will entail two
different sections represented by a detailed explanation of the research puzzle and its
components, as well as a literature review concerning the key issues of financial
instability, power, and rise of regionalism. The second part of the thesis will contain two
sections: the separate case studies of the EU and ASEAN. The analysis will then be
brought to an end with a conclusion that will synthesize and evaluate the critical findings
of the thesis in relation to the research question. This last assessment is to be viewed as
crucial, as it will allow gathering all the single pieces of the research puzzle together by
connecting the key dots among the theoretical framework, the purpose of the analysis and
the empirical results.

3

PART 1
STRUCTURE, CONCEPTS, AND CONTEXT
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CHAPTER I
RESEARCH QUESTION, METHODOLOGY,
AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In the following first chapter of the thesis, the research question will be
presented in order to draw the focus of the reader to the key structural issues of the
analysis. In a further step, the main argument will be illustrated. Subsequently, the
methodology used to verify the main hypothesis will be discussed briefly. Finally the
theoretical framework utilized to conceptualize the research question will be introduced
and more closely examined in order to show its components in a clear and unmistakable
manner.

Research Question and Objectives

The research question of the thesis deals with the general environment of
financial instability and looks at regionalism as a phenomenon that serves to avert the
risks deriving from it. The title reveals the key correlational relationship that constitutes
the object of study within the thesis: financial instability as an important element related
to the prevalence of regionalism.
The question that the thesis intends to discuss is as follows: is economic
regionalism to be considered the answer to the risks of financial instability? Is financial
instability closely linked to the fact that economically more vulnerable countries seek
mechanisms to protect their economic power and build a shield in the form of regional
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economic and monetary integration in order to avert the risks of globalization that
eventually favor strong economies and so attempt a systemic change?
Answering these questions is important for different reasons: firstly, it will
allow for a better understanding of how economic and financial globalization has
changed the realm and dynamics of international relations; secondly, it will be possible to
explain the mechanisms of international political change from the point of view of
economic interests; thirdly, it will be feasible to observe the changing economic structure
of the international system from a strategic perspective and comprehend how economic
power lies at the heart of the globalized international system; finally, the analysis will
facilitate evaluating historical events and making assumptions regarding future
developments that will significantly shape future international relations.

Main Hypothesis

The main argument refers to the fact that financial instability is related to the
fact that economically vulnerable countries seek mechanisms to protect their economic
power and build a shield in the form of regional economic and monetary integration in
order to avert the risks of globalization that eventually favor strong economies and
attempt a change in the international system. At the same time, it is argued that more
powerful states will endeavor to undermine such efforts made by weaker states at
fostering regional integration in order to prevent their relative political and economic
power in that specific region from being diminished. It is clearly identifiable that the
mode of interaction at the level of the world’s political system and the way change takes
place within this realm derive from a realist perspective.
This hypothesis has deep implications for the process of formation of
economic and political international relations and is thus crucial for understanding
6

international political change and future developments in the structure of the international
system. On the other hand and away from such a broad perspective, it is also maintained
that the phenomenon of regional integration analyzed in and for itself occurs as states
from the same geographic region have a relation of high mutual dependence that makes it
beneficial for them to participate in regional cooperation and coordination of policies.
Nevertheless, the main conclusion of the thesis remains drawn from the
observation of international political change at the higher level of interaction among
actors in the global political and economic system, thus not considering regional events
merely on the basis of their regional context. On the contrary, regional developments
need to be integrated into the broader international system in order to conceptualize their
potential impact on international relations, and specifically on those reciprocal relations
among powerful states and more vulnerable states that have formed regional
organizations.

Methodology

How to proceed in order to effectively deal with the research question and the
purpose of the study represents a crucial part of the analysis and needs to be accurately
defined and specified. Considering the high degree of complexity of the issues that
constitute the research puzzle, it is important to support and strengthen the main
argument of the thesis by the means of a wide range of sources. By doing so, the
reliability of the findings will be increased and credibility will be granted to the
conclusion of the thesis.
First of all, the analysis will start with a historical review of the growing
relevance and reach of regionalism since the end of the Second World War, while
dedicating particular attention to the strong momentum that regionalism gained shortly
7

before and in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union. In this realm, the difference
between the first and the second wave or regionalism will be more closely explained. It
will also be essential to stress the continuously growing importance of economic power
over the last sixty years in defining interactions among actors and thus shaping the
functional mechanisms of the international system. In fact, it will be shown that critical
political, socio-economic and technological events have led to a redefinition of the
concept of power different and more complex than it has usually been explicated in
realist terms.
Subsequently and not necessarily adopting a comparative approach, official
documents of regional agreements and treaties signed by members of regional
organizations such as the EU and ASEAN will be studied with respect to their declared
objectives. After that, the focus will be shifted toward an evaluation of the increasing
breadth and depth of policy coordination and the required institutional arrangements.
This will certainly be helpful in realizing the scope and depth of regionalism as a geopolitical phenomenon.
Furthermore, attention will be paid to the observation of macro-economic
indicators such as trade flows, foreign direct investment flows and others demonstrating
the increasing economic interdependence within regions. Different time frames will be
used for studying such incremental characteristic of regional interdependence. Graphs
and data will be made available in order to facilitate the understanding of the meaning of
such economic indicators.
In addition to these materials, interviews have been arranged with
representatives from the political and economic departments of regional organizations
such as the EU Commission and various diplomatic missions of EU and ASEAN
member countries including Slovenia and Indonesia in order to receive first-hand
information about past events and future prospects of development and deepening of
regional organizations for a better understanding of their objectives. The valuable insight
8

gained in such meetings will be critical for a clearer comprehension of the mode of
interactions among actors in the global system. In this sense, it will be possible to receive
direct information about the process of regional integration and the modus operandi of
regional organizations within the world’s political and economic system. Special
attention will be given to the relations between such regional bodies and bigger regional
players; e.g. in the case of Southeast Asian ASEAN’s interactions with regional powers
such as China, Japan, and the US will be further examined with regard to the main
argument of the thesis.
For instance, a visit to the Embassy of Slovenia was organized, in which a
particularly insightful talk was held with the Counselor and Deputy Head of Mission,
Sonja Cujovic, who has made a valuable contribution to the analysis thanks to her
important experience within Europe and in Southeast Asia as well. Moreover, a meeting
with the Heads of the Political and Trade Departments of the Delegation of the EU
Commission to Egypt took place, in which essential issues were discussed. Also, a series
of two different talk sessions with the Third Secretary of the Embassy of Indonesia,
Danang Waskito, have allowed for a deeper and closer discussion about critical regional
issues, such as ASEAN’s role, its internal and external relationships, as well as national
and regional responses to the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Direct consultations with
diplomatic staff are considered as significant, as they enable the scientific investigation to
reach beyond the mere evaluation of documents and data and make it possible for
scholars to observe regionalism from a different, more practical perspective.
Finally and in addition to the sources mentioned above, it has been regarded
as equally relevant to include the opinion of experts from the academia, who definitely
possess the ability to complement the insight delivered by diplomatic staff given their
broad knowledge as well as independent and autonomous thinking. For this purpose, Dr
Jill Edwards from the History Department and Dr Ibrahim El Nur from the Political
Science Department at The American University in Cairo have been interviewed.
9

For practical and transparency reasons, here follows a detailed list comprised
of all the scholars and diplomatic staff who have been involved in the analytical research
and evaluation of facts and data:
-

Mr. Michael Ryan, Counselor, Political Affairs, Delegation of the European
Commission to Egypt;

-

Mrs. Barbara Stacher, First Secretary, Trade Affairs, Delegation of the
European Commission to Egypt;

-

Mr. Thomas Viot, Expert, Trade and Economic Section, Delegation of the
European Commission to Egypt;

-

Mrs. Sonja Cujovic, Counselor and Deputy Head of Mission of the
Embassy of Slovenia;

-

Mr. Danang Waskito, Third Secretary of the Embassy of Indonesia,
Information Section;

-

Dr. Jill Edwards, Professor in the History Department and Director of the
European Studies Program at The American University in Cairo;

-

Dr. Ibrahim El Nur, Professor in the Political Science Department at The
American University in Cairo;

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework of the thesis will include two dimensions
integrated with each other: Gilpin’s theory of international political change at a macro or
global level and Keohane’s and Nye’s theory of interdependence at sub-macro or
regional level. In other words, the theoretical basis for the thesis will be characterized by
two layers that are connected with each other reflecting an integration of liberalist into
10

realist thought in order to form one single framework. In the following paragraphs
sufficient explanations will be provided
Starting from the macro level, the underlying conceptual framework will be
drawn from a political and economic perspective on change in world politics. Gilpin’s
theory of international political change offers a useful tool for comprehending the nature
and dynamics of change (Gilpin, in Viotti and Kauppi 1999 pp. 145-152). However,
within this research thesis the focus will be shifted more toward aspects that are
secondary in his original model. The importance of the tendency of smaller and less
powerful states toward regionalism for counterbalancing the more powerful states or
hegemons will be highlighted, while the validity of the core assumptions of Gilpin’s
theory are still maintained. Indeed, international relations continue to be characterized by
a continuing struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of
anarchy. On the other hand, the shape of such struggle has been changing over time due
to political, economic, technological and other developments that have brought about
change in the international system. This change implies a redistribution of power that
causes actions and reactions from both powerful and less powerful states to modify the
equilibrium of the system in their favor and so advance their own interests. In the face of
the consciousness of less powerful states of the fact that no significant change can be
achieved by each one individually, their drive towards regionalism is seen as a
mechanism for changing the system for their own benefit and as a counterbalance
measure against more powerful states.
In sum, not a complete reversal of Gilpin’s model, but only an adaptation of
it will be adopted, which serves the purpose of the thesis of explaining regionalism as a
phenomenon correlated to financial instability that can be conceived as a linked trend by
weaker states toward changing power relations in the international system in their favor.
Thus, a relationship between regionalism and international political change is
established. At the same time, however, as will be illustrated, more powerful states will
11

still seek to shape the international systems and the relations among actors according to
realist principles and decision-making process.
As a complementary part of the theoretical framework used for this thesis and
in order to understand the significance of regionalism in the dynamics of Gilpin’s theory
of international political change at the macro level, Keohane’s and Nye’s theory of
complex interdependence at the sub-macro or regional level will be integrated into the
basic theoretical framework of the thesis. At the sub-macro or regional level,
interdependence, as defined by both authors as referring to situations characterized by
reciprocal effects among countries resulting from international transactions of various
kinds (the focus will be directed toward states, although other actors are acknowledged),
is considered as the main feature of international relations among member states of
regional organizations. Countries within a specific region are assumed to have a relation
of high mutual dependence that makes it beneficial for them to participate in regional
coordination of policies. Such interdependence makes the rise and promotion of common
interests possible, although not necessary (Keohane and Nye, in Viotti and Kauppi 1999
pp. 307-317).
For this thesis, the first characteristic of the concept of complex
interdependence that deals with multiple channels connecting societies is regarded as less
important, since the focus is shifted toward the state as the main actor. On the contrary,
particular attention will be given to the second and third characteristics of
interdependence: the former refers to the idea that the agenda of interstate relationships
consists of multiple issues not organized along hierarchical lines that need policy
coordination in the face of high opportunity costs. The latter feature deals with the
assumption that military force is not used by governments toward other governments
within the same region in a situation of stable and durable complex interdependence
(Keohane and Nye, in Viotti and Kauppi 1999 pp. 311-312). In this context, the authors

12

argue that the potential role of international institutions in political bargaining is highly
increased (Keohane and Nye, in Viotti and Kauppi 1999 p. 316).
Keohane’s and Nye’s opinion that both Realism and their theory of
interdependence represent ideal types and that most reality-based situations will fall
somewhere between these two extremes is representative for this research work. Such
stance on these theories of international relations allows integrating them into one single
model that combines key aspects of both.
In sum, Keohane’s interdependence theory will be used in order to prove that
cooperation among states is possible at a sub-macro or regional level in the presence of
mutual dependence and interests within a certain confined region. Then, this Liberalist
approach will be integrated into a broader realist perspective at the macro level that will
allow explaining how cooperation within a region or regionalism can be regarded as a
realist mechanism for advancing the members’ own interests against other regional or
global hegemons. Indeed, it is maintained that weaker states seek regional integration in
order to increase their leverage against major powers. By doing this, they provide
protection of their economies in the face of financial instability and the deriving high
probability of financial crises that would affect them more severely than powerful
countries, which would benefit in relative terms from a realist perspective.

Limitations of Theories

In this section of the thesis the focus will be directed toward the discussion
over the limitations of both theories that form the conceptual framework underlying the
analysis. This will make it possible to reach a more complete understanding of the
reasons for the chosen integration of two distinct theories and so for the double-layered
structure of the theoretical framework. This concise examination will be organized into
13

three different subsections: the first two will encompass a critique of each separate theory
with respect to the research question, while the last subsection will present the reasons
for an integration of both theories and reinforce the view that these may represent
complementary parts of a single theory.

Gilpin’s Model of International Political Change

Although Gilpin’s model entails some differences from the early realist
writings of Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes, it certainly maintains a vast part of its
essential characteristics. Firstly, the author’s starting point is represented by the typical
realist postulation of a state of anarchy in the international system. In this sense,
international relations are understood as a recurring struggle for wealth and power among
independent actors, in which there are no binding rules or generally accepted laws with
the necessary sanctions mechanisms that could force actors to abide by them. This
assumption clearly derives from Hobbes’ state of nature of the human being and is
extrapolated to the level of international relations among states. In this context, realists
do not refer to anarchy as an image of violence, destruction, or chaos. On the contrary,
they tend to focus merely on the absence of any authority above states, which are seen as
sovereign and independent actors. For such reasons, it is possible to assert that anarchy is
the defining characteristic of the environment, within which states interact with other
each other, thus shaping international relations (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 p. 68).
The other typical realist feature of the international system is represented by
the uneven distribution of power among states (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 p. 71). Most
modern realists describe power as the sum of military, economic, technological,
diplomatic, and other capabilities at the disposal of the state in relation to the capabilities
of other states (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 p. 64). Therefore, it seems obvious that despite
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the absence of authority there is a hierarchy of power in international politics (Viotti and
Kauppi, 1999 p. 68).
Hence, according to the characteristics of the international system proposed
by realist theory, alliances and coalitions may have a merely temporary character and are
not long-term oriented. They are transitory phenomena that help sustain the stability of
the international system by creating a bipolar or multipolar balance of power among
opposite sides. This surely constitutes a serious practical limitation, when it comes to
analyzing the empirical data, since it cannot be accounted for stable, solid, and long-term
oriented multilateral and regional agreements such as the EU or ASEAN. In other words,
the premises of a state of anarchy combined with an uneven distribution of power among
states make the realist theory too deterministic. It is assumed that there are objective
conditions that cannot be altered or influenced by policymakers (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999
pp. 73, 83-84).
Secondly, it appears clear that the state is regarded as the only relevant actor
in the international system, which follows the realist state-centered view of international
relations (Gilpin, in Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 p. 148). However, this is not entirely
representative of the empirical reality, as it can be stated that non-state actors, such as
influential multinational or other non-governmental organizations that operate in a crossnational environment do play a key role in the process of policy making. Consequently,
this fact has a critical impact on the decision-making process of the executive body of a
country (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 pp. 84-85). From the point of view of the thesis, states
are still regarded as the main players in the international system. Nevertheless, the
importance of other non-state actors is also acknowledged, although this is definitely not
the focus point of the analysis.
Thirdly, Gilpin’s model shares with Realism the fact that it is mainly
concerned with military security and it considers war as the primary mechanism for
settling disputes at the international level. In this respect, peace is only seen as a period
15

of truce between wars (Gilpin, in Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 p. 148). It is also for this
reason that cooperation in terms of alliances among different states is treated as an
instrumental part of the stability theory of balance of power and does not make any real
difference to the state of anarchy of the international environment. Of course, this cannot
explain a number of real situations, in which war has not been the prime means for
resolving a crisis. On the contrary, the role of peaceful negotiation and conflict resolution
needs to be acknowledged. Furthermore, even economic interdependence is conceived in
terms of security and distribution of power. According to realist thought, this should thus
be minimized, as it could compromise the capabilities of an individual state in relation to
another by allowing the latter to have some leverage over the former (Viotti and Kauppi,
1999 p. 77). This specific feature shows the limited usefulness and shortsightedness of
realist theory, since it does not recognize the consequent reciprocity of interdependence,
which allows for a mutual deterrence from hurting the other’s interests by giving
leverage to both sides.
Hence, the model does not fully acknowledge other important issues, such as
economy or society. Indeed, realists have usually tended to view the economy as
subordinate to political choice. Thus, the issues of national and international security are
defined as the object of high politics and are regarded as more important than economy,
trade, finance and other socioeconomic and humanitarian matters, which form the object
of low politics (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 p. 77). From the perspective of the thesis,
nevertheless, the economic dimension of power is considered more critical to
international relations given the high level of interdependence created by the process of
economic and financial globalization as well as the need for sound economic
performance in order to finance foreign policy. Therefore, it can be asserted that in many
cases economy dominates or at least influences political choice to a great extent, and not
only vice-versa as sustained by realist theory. In this regard, one could also speak of the
increasing relevance of geo-economics compared to geo-politics.
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Another crucial limitation that is worth examining refers to the question of
rationality. Gilpin, according to the realist tradition, assumes that states are rational
actors, and their decisions and actions are based on sound rational reasoning. It goes
without saying that this point is also connected to the issues of defining national interests
and the view of the state as a unitary actor. The author takes a very clear stance on this
matter, as he claims that states will seek to bring about change in the international
political and economic system by the means of territorial, political, and economic
expansion, if the expected benefits of action exceed its expected costs. The effect would
be a modified distribution of power among actors in the global system (Gilpin, in Viotti
and Kauppi, 1999 pp. 149-152). However, there are a number of difficulties with such
approach to states behavior. In fact, the main flaw in Gilpin’s model lies in the
oversimplifying rationality assumption. This is problematic, as it presumes the
availability of perfect information as well as the ability to process and analyze huge
amounts of data and facts. These conditions are almost never given in reality. In addition,
this premise leads to an underestimation of subjective and situational variables, such as
human behavior, that is not necessarily rational. As a consequence, the objectives of
states, the definition of their national interests and actions retain a certain level of
subjectivity and might also be affected by the complex interplay of various forces within
the state.
Furthermore, Gilpin does not directly address the reasons for states to
undertake actions aimed at changing the international system in their favor. Regarding
the presumed state of anarchy of the global environment as the major cause for such
states behavior can be seen as an oversimplification of reality and disregard of other
objective and subjective factors that play a role in a specific situation. In this sense,
Gilpin’s approach based on a cost-and-benefit analysis that underlies the decisionmaking process is controversial, because there is no perfect information at the disposal of
the decision-makers, so that decisions are most probably not only based on objective
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data, but also on subjective considerations as well as situational factors. Rationality is
necessarily bounded or limited, and can never be absolute.
Despite all these limitations of Gilpin’s model, the author has made his most
valuable contribution to the development of Realism as a theory and in general to the
study of International Relations by the means of shifting the attention toward the
dynamics, patterns, and circumstances, under which international political change occurs.
In this context, it is important to note Gilpin’s recognition of the possibility that political,
economic, and technological developments may play a significant role in spurring change
or producing the conditions, under which change takes place. The key limitations with
regard to his contribution are twofold: firstly Gilpin’s model focuses excessively on
security and war as the primary vehicle of change, while there have been a number of
peaceful transitions, negotiations and conflict resolutions that remain unexplained by this
model. Secondly, the author considers international political change as being attempted
and eventually achieved merely by stronger states by deploying their higher capabilities
compared to more vulnerable countries. This perspective has no explanatory validity,
when individual powerful states have to deal with weaker states grouped in broad and
cohesive regional organizations that prefer to lead negotiations as one single actor in
order to maximize their leverage and minimize the influence of their counterpart. This
represents a crucial point for the theoretical framework of the thesis, as the focus of the
analysis will be directed toward the behavior of such less influential states and their
actions represented by regional institutions. At the same time, it is acknowledged that
bigger regional or global powers will still try to achieve change for their own benefit. In
order to do this, they might resolve to undermine the drive toward regionalism, as they
view it as a threat to their regional power.
In sum, it can be asserted that there are a number of relevant limitations and
weaknesses in Gilpin’s model of international political change. However, his main
contribution has been extremely important for the further development of the model itself
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into a more comprehensive one that is able to gain a considerable higher explanatory
capability achieved by expanding its reach and dealing with its shortcomings.

Keohane’s and Nye’s Model of Complex Interdependence

Liberalism in general and Keohane’s and Nye’s model specifically can be
considered as the complementary counterpart of Realism. In fact, most of the weaknesses
of Gilpin’s model and the realist tradition can be identified with the strengths of the
liberalist approach. From this point of view, the strengths of Realism and Gilpin’s
framework in particular can be regarded on the whole as the shortcomings of liberalist
theories.
Indeed, Liberalism shows little regard for the traditionally realist statecentered view of international relations. In fact, it needs to be underlined that in the end
the states are the primary actors in the international system, as they make and implement
decisions, although they might be influenced to a certain degree by several internal and
external forces during the policy and decision-making processes. Certainly, it is neither
feasible to estimate how big such influence is in reality nor to reach an exact
understanding of how intricate such interplay of factors is. For this reason, Liberalism
offers a useful theory in realizing the complexity of real situations; however, it does not
provide an effective practical method for simplifying the extremely high amount of
information at hand, which is obviously necessary in order to attain a precise and
accurate analysis of the policy and decision-making process.
As the analysis of Keohane’s and Nye’s model is taken further and deeper, a
few more critical flaws need to be more closely examined: firstly, a crucial limitation of
Keohane’s and Nye’s theory is represented by its inability to explain the still high degree
of frequency of war as a mechanism to solve international disputes. Especially, as far as
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regional conflicts are concerned, the model does not deliver any satisfactory answer to
the question of order, as the concept of complex interdependence is not capable of
illuminating the reasons and circumstances, under which conflicts are still resolved by
violent means.
Secondly, there is an inherent disregard of the state of anarchy in the
international system. The fact that international regimes, institutions and organizations
might arise due to a situation of mutual dependence does not necessarily mean that the
absence of any hierarchy of authority is overcome.
Thirdly, another important limitation derives from the consideration that
Keohane’s and Nye’s model does not possess a truly global character, but is rather
confined within a certain geographical region. This is an essential point for a full
understanding of the theoretical model developed for the thesis, as it exemplifies the need
for an integration of both theories into one single conceptual framework.
Despite such weaknesses, the fundamental contribution that Keohane and
Nye have made to the study of International Relations is definitely represented by the
illustration of a world, in which actors might find themselves in a situation of complex
interdependence. With respect to the research question and main argument of the thesis,
both political scientists have facilitated the construction of the theoretical framework as a
synthesis of Realism and Liberalism by pointing out the possibility that international
organizations will act as arenas for political action by weak states (Keohane and Nye, in
Viotti and Kauppi 1999 p. 317). This specific advancement provides the grounds for
sustaining the key hypothesis that more vulnerable states will use regional agreements
and institutions in order to increase their individual leverage in a context of financial
instability against strong regional and global powers by bringing their capabilities
together and acting as one single player.
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Need for an Integration of Both Theories

How does order come about or is achieved in the international system? This
is the ever recurring question for scholars, academia and diplomats who deal with
international relations. Realism and Liberalism, as exemplified in the specific models of
Gilpin, on one side, and Keohane and Nye on the other, offer two plausible explanations
of the mechanism that regulates and fosters order in the global system. The very fact that
both theories of international political change and that of complex interdependence seek
to find an answer to the same question of order in international relations makes it worth
exploring ways, in which an integration of models can bring the analysis forward.
Of course, Liberalism provides a different perspective on international
relations than Realism. Both theories draw the attention to multiple variables and
important features. By doing this, they are never antithetical or irreconcilable; on the
contrary, as has been previously discussed, they should be regarded as complementary
parts of the same group of theories. For instance, the differences between Realism and
Marxism are much deeper and more substantial, while Liberalism and Realism do have
many common characteristics and points of encounter.
Their integration takes place at the level of the international system analyzed
from a broad viewpoint, as the key aspects of each model are evaluated in terms of their
compatibility. At this point, it is worth reminding that a number of modifications and
adaptations of the original models have been decided and implemented in order to
respond to their inherent weaknesses and deliver the grounds for a successful
incorporation into one single framework. It is argued that the crucial difference between
macro and sub-macro level perspectives represents an essential element that enables the
construction of a clearly identifiable double-layered conceptual model. From a sub-macro
point of view, Keohane and Nyes’s concept of complex interdependence facilitates
understanding the rise and relevance of regional cooperation. At the same time, from a
21

macro standpoint these regional players comprised of weaker states need to be included
into the wider context of an anarchy-based international system, within which the
destabilizing forces of financial and economic globalization are more likely to damage
vulnerable countries than others. According to the realist approach, because they feel
threatened by more powerful countries and the risks of financial instability, they decide
to increase the level of integration and use regional organizations as an effective means
to raise their individual leverage in international relations. Hence, the capability of
weaker states to seek and achieve international political change is fully acknowledged.
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CHAPTER II
FINANCIAL INSTABILITY, POWER, AND REGIONALISM

The second chapter of the thesis will include a review of the main literature
concerning the three most important areas that form the context, within which the
analysis of international relations is pursued. As the heading suggests, these consist of
the issues of financial instability, power, and regionalism. An introduction to the
following relevant questions is offered, while these will be further explained and
illustrated in the second part of the thesis by the means of the case studies of the EU and
ASEAN:
-

What is economic and financial globalization? What are the reasons for
global financial instability?

-

How is power to be defined in the context of globalization?

-

How can the rise of international regimes and in particular regional
organizations be explained? What impact has globalization had on
regionalism?

Globalization and Financial Instability

In this section of the second chapter, some of the key aspects of the process
of globalization will be presented and discussed. Among these there is certainly the
question of finding a proper definition for this extremely complex concept. Furthermore,
the role of global capitalism and technological progress will be illustrated also in terms of
their destabilizing effect on the world’s economic and financial architecture. In order to
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provide empirical evidence of the instability deriving from globalization, studies and
charts of a representative sample of relevant financial crises will be provided.

The Problem of Definition

Undoubtedly, globalization is one of the most discussed, controversial, and
confusing concepts of contemporary politics. Three are the main questions that arise: the
first is concerned with the definition of the notion; the second aims at establishing
whether globalization constitutes a new or an old phenomenon; the third and last
investigates the nature of its impact.
There is no single clear-cut, widely accepted definition of the term, as its
meaning depends on the perspective, scale, and depth of the analysis. Indeed, there are a
number of possible explanations that direct the attention to specific aspects worth
considering. For instance, the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan made the
following public statement in September 3, 1998:
Globalization has an immense potential to improve people’s lives, but it can
disrupt – and destroy – them as well. Those who do not accept its pervasive,
all-encompassing ways are often left behind. It is our task to prevent this; to
ensure that globalization leads to progress, prosperity and security for all. I
intend that the United Nations shall lead this effort (Annan 1998 cited in
Kim, 2000 p. 1).
From a similar point of view, the British sociologist Anthony Giddens made
the succeeding comment during a session of the Reith Lecture organized by the BBC
network in 1999:
Globalization not only pulls upwards, it pushes downwards, creating new
pressures for local autonomy. The American sociologist Daniel Bell
expresses this very well when he says that the nation becomes too small to
solve the big problems, but also too large to solve the small
ones…..globalization is becoming increasingly de-centered not under the
control of any group of nations, and still less of the large corporations. Its
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effects are felt just as much as in the Western countries as elsewhere
(Giddens 1999 cited in Kim, 2000 p. 1).
These definitions all point out different central traits of the concept that are
worth analyzing further: firstly, the global character and reach of globalization, which
leads to the consequence that there are issues that concern the global sphere and cannot
be tackled from a narrow locally-oriented angle. In fact, it can be asserted that there is an
evident, although fuzzy contrast, and discrepancy between the global and local context,
so that responding or finding answers to new or altered problems has become more
complex. Secondly, it appears clear that globalization is more than a one-dimensional
phenomenon. As a matter of fact, it involves many different realms and takes place in all
key aspects of contemporary international life, not only in the economic, but also in the
social, cultural, diplomatic, political, security, and environmental domains, albeit at a
different pace and intensity (Kim, 2000 pp. 10-11). Finally and more significantly, the
broadly accepted truth is mentioned in the preceding quotes that globalization offers
great opportunities, but at the same time poses serious threats to the ability of states, nonstate actors, people and communities to act, react and adapt in a deeply changed
environment. In other words, this phenomenon poses a challenge of governance, i.e. there
is a need to define clear rules in order to govern newly introduced or altered processes.
Probably the simplest, however most effective definition of globalization was
delivered by Jones, who argues that the quantitative characteristics of this phenomenon
have developed to a point, at which they have generated a qualitative change in world
affairs:
The most general qualitative proposition about globalization is that it is
characterized by time-space compression, in which distant events and
developments impact upon local conditions with greater immediacy and
speed than in the past (Jones, 1999 p. 365).
This definition summarizes in a clear-cut manner the new elements added by
globalization that pose new challenges to the question of governance by states. This
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represents a principal area of interest for the research question of the thesis, that is how to
cope with financial instability deriving from the phenomenon of globalization from the
point of view of the major actors in the international system, i.e. states.

Global Capitalism and Instability

The most frequently debated dimension of such broad and complex process is
definitely represented by the so-called economic globalization, which may be interpreted
as the cause of financial instability. This has its roots in the spread of global capitalism
over the last two hundred years and more intensively in the aftermath of the Second
World War, as will be more closely examined in this subsection. Special attention will be
given to the latest economic and technological developments that have fostered a new
level of economic integration, while facilitating instantaneous capital flow and thus
increasing the probability of financial unbalances and quick speculative trends. This will
be demonstrated by the means of a few selected cases of financial crisis that occurred in
the last twenty years, i.e. the US stock market crash of 1987 and the Mexican currency
crisis of 1994.
In the last few decades, the growth of international trade has been higher than
that of world output. However, increased international trade is not only the cause of
economic globalization as the nurturing of interdependence between economies at a
global level. Indeed, there are few key developments in technology, finance and foreign
direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations (MNCs) that need to be thoroughly
scrutinized. In this respect, globalization is the result of many different changes and
advancements. Hence it can be regarded as an aspect of modern capitalism, founded on
technological progress (Gilpin 2000, p. 18-29).
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In the second half of the last century, trade barriers have declined
significantly due to successive rounds of trade negotiations, as it is exemplified by the
drop from forty to only 6 percent of the average tariff levels of industrialized countries on
imported goods. The general trend is illustrated in appendix I. In addition, since the late
1970s a wave of deregulations and privatizations has further opened national economies
to trade and FDI. At the same time, the invention of new technologies in transportation,
such as trucks and more importantly air carriers, has drastically reduced transportation
costs, encouraged trade expansion and investment in other economies. In fact, this has
facilitated the growth of FDI, which has been even higher than that of international trade.
Since the 1980s FDI has risen with an astonishing average annual growth rate of 15
percent. Such significant development, i.e. the expansion of MNCs and the rapid increase
in FDI, has had a deep impact on the structure of the world economy by integrating
different national economies more utterly. Hence, economic interdependence on a global
scale has been strengthened. As a consequence, on the other hand, grave economic or
financial unbalances created in one region can have impressive spill-over effects to other
regions, and sometimes even on the global economy as a whole (Gilpin, 2000 pp. 18-21).
The following figures and tables highlight the outstanding growth of trade
flows and FDI in absolute terms and in relation to GDP growth. Figure 1 shows the
stunning expansion of exports during the three decades that followed the end of the
Second World War. The curve illustrates the fact that the aftermath of that war marked
the beginning of a new and unprecedented era of international trade, when one takes into
account that the previous one was highly biased by colonialism and trade flows between
colonies and colonial powers. At the same time, figure 2 indicates the consequent
growing importance of trade as a portion of world output between 1950 and 1995. On the
other hand, tables 1 and 2 emphasize the uneven distribution of inward and outward FDI
stocks by group of economies, which makes it easy to comprehend the enormous
disparity between developed and developing countries. It is worth noting that such
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serious global unbalance has only minimally changed overtime. Indeed, if the first
group’s share of FDI stock as of 1980 is compared with its more recent value of 2002, it
can be concluded that no relevant shift has taken place, as this figure dropped by only 1
percent from 88 to 87 percent of the world FDI stock. Furthermore, figure 3 presents data
concerning the annual growth of outward FDI stock by region for the same period of time
between 1980 and 2002. It appears clear from this figure that FDI has grown
substantially over the past three decades and the level of interconnectedness among
economies has increased dramatically. Finally, figure 4 is extremely insightful, as it puts
the growth of world GDP, exports and FDI into relation for the period from 1970 to
2003. It is clearly discernible that during the 1970s the growth of these figures was equal
and that exports quickly became more relevant during the 1980s. However, the data show
that over time, precisely during the 1990s, FDI gained more relevance and weight. In
fact, its growth has been remarkably higher than that of output or trade.

Figure 1. Total Merchandise Export Growth 1952-1970, % Change

Source: World Trade Organization

28

Figure 2. World Trade/Output Growth 1950-1995, % Change

Source: Terborg, 2003 p. 57.

Table 1. Inward FDI Stock, by Group of Economies in Billions of US$

Source: UNCTAD
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Table 2. Outward FDI Stock, by Group of Economies in Billions of US$

Source: UNCTAD

Figure 3. Annual Growth Rates of Outward FDI Stock, % Change

Source: UNCTAD
Note: Data for Central and Eastern European are for 1992-1999 and 2000-2002 only.
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Figure 4. World Total FDI, Exports, and GDP

Source: UNCTAD

As a result of this number of developments, FDI has grown faster and more
substantially than both international trade and world output. As a matter of fact, through
a comparison between figure 1 and 2 on one side, and table 1 and 2 on the other, it
appears evident that FDI has become the figure, by which global economic
interconnectedness is measured. In this context, it is important to take into consideration
the data contained in appendix II and III regarding the inwards and outward FDI stock
ranking by country. It seems justified to state that the global economic interdependence
or globalization is dominated by developed countries that are the biggest investors and
receivers of investment at the same time. This provides them with a unique power to
influence the economic course of the rest of the world. In this sense, weak states and
regions cannot exert a decisive amount of influence on global economic affairs. For this
reasons, it is possible and reasonable to assert that developing countries and regions, i.e.
the South, are vulnerable to the power of the developed world, i.e. the North.
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Furthermore, successive and continuous advancements in communication and
information technology have caused transaction costs to fall dramatically within a short
period of time. The broad introduction of the computer and internet has had an
extraordinary impact on every aspect of social, economic and political life. It appears
obvious that the use of such devices will have an important impact on the productivity of
the global economy. The rise of the New Economy does not only refer to software
companies. On the contrary, from a broader perspective it deals with the implementation
of these technological advances in all aspects of economic activities. Although it is not
entirely foreseeable, the information and communication revolution is likely to have a
much greater impact in the medium-long-term by producing a new wave of modern
industrial revolution based on computing systems and internet, and create a new
Kontradieff wave (Gilpin 2000. pp. 29-34). This Russian economist drew the attention in
the 1920s to the possibility of long economic cycles – roughly fifty years long – in the
economies of major capitalist countries that arise from clusters of innovations at
particular times and in particular economic sectors. These clusters create a new leading
sector of the economy which grows rapidly and drives a general economic upswing, such
as the Kontradieff waves fostered by the steam and electric power (Goldstein, 1985 pp.
411-412).
One of the main effects of such progress has been the formation of a far more
highly integrated international financial system. Capital has become mobile through the
use of computer and internet in a way that it can be moved from one part of the world to
the other within seconds. In addition, since the mid 1970s, the removal of capital controls
and the creation of new financial instruments have greatly contributed to fostering a
highly integrated financial system. This can be easily exemplified by the volume of
foreign exchange trading that reached the astonishing level of around US$ 1.5 trillion per
day in the 1990s. At the same time, the global volume of exports was US$ 25 billion per
day (Gilpin, 2000 pp. 21-22). Such figures can directly explain the higher financial
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integration and linkage between different economies compared to their trade relations. As
the mobility of capital is often driven by short-term decisions of speculative nature,
global finance has become a cause of economic instability. For these reasons, the
possibility of the very same phenomenon of spill-over effects among interconnected
regions fostered by huge unbalances, which has been identified in the realm of
international trade and FDI, can be expected to be even more realistic and substantial for
the domain of financial globalization. It seems obvious to arrive to such conclusion if a
comparison between the weight of economic and financial globalization as separate
processes is drawn, i.e. US$ 1.5 trillion per day in financial transactions exceed by far the
volume of US$ 25 billion per day in trade. This huge difference is illustrated in the
following figure 5 (Gilpin, 2000 pp. 21-22).

Figure 5. Foreign Exchange to Exports in US$ Billion per Day
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The prevalence of a highly integrated international financial system is also
confirmed by the significance of a few other developments. For instance, the amount of
investment capital seeking higher returns has grown enormously. In fact, by the mid1990s, mutual funds, pension funds, and the like totaled US$ 20 trillion. This represents
ten times the 1980 figure. In addition, the weight of these substantial investments is
greatly magnified, as a growing part of them is financed with borrowed funds. Finally,
derivatives and other financial instruments play an important role in international
finance. Given their total value of approximately US$ 360 trillion, which is even larger
than the value of the entire global economy, they have massively contributed to the rise
of financial instability. From the perspective of these facts and statistics, it goes without
saying that this unstable financial interconnectedness has a profound impact on and a big
potential for destabilization the global economy (Gilpin, 2000 p. 22).

Figure 6. Evolution of International Financial Integration, 1983-2001

Source: Lane, 2003 p. 45
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As can be seen in figure 6, this financial revolution has had the effect of
linking national economies more closely to one another, increasing the capital available
to developing countries, and in some cases accelerating economic development.
However, it is a matter of fact that large portions of these financial flows and capital
investments are short-term, highly volatile, and speculative. For this reason, international
finance has become the weakest and most unstable aspect of the global capitalist system.
In fact, the immense scale, velocity, and speculative nature of financial transactions have
made governments more vulnerable to sudden changes in these movements. As will be
presented in the following subsection, there are a number of events, e.g. the crash of
1987, the European currency crisis of 1992, the Mexican peso collapse of 1994, and the
devastating East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, which confirm this hypothesis
and support the argument that individual countries have become more exposed to forces
that they are not capable of controlling. It will be shown that this problematic condition
drives governments to seek mechanisms to shield the value of their economy, of which
regional integration provides the best example (Gilpin, 2000 p. 22).

Examples of Financial Instability

At this point, a few cases will be presented and briefly examined, which will
enable a better understanding of the scale and scope of such highly unstable international
financial system. The specific financial crises that hit the European Monetary System and
East Asia during the 1990s will be more closely analyzed in the second part of the thesis
within the respective chapters concerning European and Southeast Asian regionalism.
The prevailing global financial instability became increasingly apparent since
the Black Monday of October 19, 1987, which is to be remembered as the worst day in
the history of the American stock markets. In fact, within only one single day of
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transactions, the Dow Jones Index dropped an astonishing 22.6% of its total value. This
event triggered a serious downward movement on the major stock markets of the world,
e.g. the London Stock Exchange Index lost 20 percent of its value within one week, the
German Dax suffered a drop of around 30 percent within one month, and the rest of the
markets followed the same trend (Benetazzo, 2005 pp. 52-55). As can be seen from the
following graph, the collapse of the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index was even heavier,
falling by approximately 45 percent within only one week of transactions.

Figure 7. S&P 500 Index, 1985-1987

Source: Bates, 1991 p. 1010.

The crash of 1987 came unexpectedly. In fact, if the information concerning
the put and call options is analyzed, it needs to be underlined that the price for put
options, which serve as a crash insurance, was unusually high during the year preceding
the crash until the market peaked in August 1987. After that, however, the price for put
36

options went back to normal levels during the two months before the actual collapse
(Bates, 1990 pp. 1009-1012). This figure clearly indicates that market participants
expected substantial negative jumps in the market, although there were no strong fears of
a crash in the two months immediately preceding Black Monday. For this reason, it is
argued that if the crash was a rational bubble – a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy – this
burst in August, not on October 19 (Bates, 1990 pp. 1036-1037).
Prior to this event, an unprecedented worldwide stock market boom had
taken place lasting for almost four years, from 1983 to 1987. Similarly to the situation in
1929, such prolonged wave of positive increases in stock prices caused a general sense of
euphoria among investors. Of course, a few analysts were conscious of the fact that such
boom was unsound and unsustainable in the long-term, and that at some point an
adjustment would occur. Thus, in many respects, the crisis of 1987 resembled the crash
of 1929. A number of events unleashed a chain reaction that finally brought the situation
out of control. The government bond market in the United States was mainly dependent
on Japanese buying. Therefore, when Japan started selling these bonds in order to face a
strong speculative wave in the internal bond and stock market, the downward pressure on
the US Dollar was enhanced. At the same time, the US administration was apparently
planning to limit tax deductibility in leveraged buyouts of companies, which caused
discontent among investors. The last major factor was a dramatic article in the Sunday,
October 18, issue of the New York Times, in which the Treasury Secretary, James Baker,
openly advocated for a devaluation of the American currency (Soros, 1988 pp. 65-69).
This undermined the credibility of the US market dramatically and spread panic among
market participants, who sought an exit from such unstable circumstances. As a
consequence, an enormous amount of sell orders was accumulated during the weekend,
so that the Dow Jones Index was already losing around 10 percent at market opening on
October 19 (Benetazzo, 2005 pp. 54-55).
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In this context, it needs to be remembered that this crash occurred in 1987,
when financial markets were not as developed as they are today. For example, during the
1990s hedge funds and the like greatly increased their share of investment. Indeed, these
speculative firms have come to control more than 10 percent of the American stock
market, so that they can exert a decisive influence on the overall direction of the market
as well as on the movement of individual stocks. If for instance the development of the
price of crude oil is examined, it could be concluded that its increase would reflect the
actual rise of demand toward a stable supply. In reality, this is only partially true. As is
known, private investors have recently entered the market of futures, thus increasing the
speculative pressures on such financial instruments. Nowadays, one only needs an online
bank account in order to buy and sell commodities such as crude oil, gas and others. This
fact illustrates the extremely enhanced potential for market distortions by short-term
oriented, speculative investments.
A second example of instability is provided by the financial crisis that struck
the Mexican Peso in 1994. Of course, the specifics of the situation as well as the causes
of the individual crisis are different from case to case. However, it can be asserted that
there is a systemic problem underlying this chain of events that have occurred in recent
times in different regions of the world. In the instance of Mexico, the question that arises
is whether there were any indicators signaling the build-up to the crisis that occurred at
the end of 1994. It is argued that this financial crisis was not the result of poor fiscal
performance by the Mexican government, which is quite different from the nature of the
previous Mexican crisis of 1982. In fact, during the period of 1990-1994 Mexico’s
operational budget balance had been in surplus and Mexico’s debt/gross domestic
product ratio was low, down from 78.4 percent in 1986 to 34.7 percent in 1993. From the
point of view of some scholars, the Mexican financial crisis was determined by
unexpected external and internal shocks that were not dealt with by sound and adequate
actions (Sachs, Tornell, Velasco, Giavazzi and Szeleky, 1996 pp. 16-19).
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Two important figures were indicating that Mexico was heading toward a
financial stalemate, although not necessarily a crisis: a currency overvaluation and a large
and increasing current account deficit. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Mexican Peso
increased by 20-25 percent relative to the long-term. The latter figure, defined as the
balance between savings and investments, started deteriorating during the same period of
time due to a declining national savings rate. Nevertheless, it is argued that these factors
alone are not capable of explaining a deep financial crisis such as the one that occurred in
1994 (Sachs, Tornell, Velasco, Giavazzi and Szeleky, 1996 pp. 19-21). Indeed, many
countries around the world show similar, if not even worse economic conditions, but
these have not led their economy to any comparable collapse. This came unexpectedly
given the absence of strong or unmistakable warnings.
Therefore, it can be asserted that other factors such as the political shocks of
early 1994 had a considerable impact on convincing many foreign investors to begin the
withdrawal of their funds from the Mexican economy, which ultimately brought about a
strong downward pressure on the Peso and so caused the crisis. The assassination of
political leaders and the rise of an armed rebellion in the state of Chiapas led by the
Zapatista National Liberation Army posed serious challenges to the internal political
stability of the country (Gilbreth and Otero, 2001 p. 7). In addition, the financial
vulnerability to external forces that was generated through the economic liberalization
reforms sponsored by the IMF during the 1980s and 1990s contributed to the deepening
of the impasse. After the political assassinations of early 1994, the Mexican currency
devaluated by approximately 10 percent. It can be imagined that a further depreciation of
the national currency would have alienated the Mexican population even more. Of
course, the presidential elections coming up in August 1994 did not allow for any further
loss of political support to the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party. This helps
understand the decision of the Mexican government not to devaluate. However, in the
months following the elections, the national reserves continued to drop sharply to a point
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where it became counterproductive or too onerous to sustain the Peso against the
withdrawal of funds from Mexico. This situation exposed the Mexican currency to
speculative attacks. In December 1994, the public announcement of the state of the
economy and the related devaluation caused major panic among investors, which in the
end massively and decisively contributed to the emergence of the crisis. Due to the fact
that the Mexican economy was not insolvent, but only illiquid at the time, it can be
maintained that a softer landing would have been possible by implementing adjustment
policies at the right time. It appears that the political objectives of the ruling party in the
following elections constituted a higher priority for the Mexican political leaders (Sachs,
Tornell, Velasco, Giavazzi and Szeleky, 1996 pp. 40-43). Figure 8 shows the sudden and
drastic movement of the Peso-US Dollar exchange rate. The Mexican currency lost
approximately 60 percent of its value within one year, dropping from three to almost
eight Pesos per one US Dollar.

Figure 8. Number of Mexican Pesos for 1 US Dollar, 1993-2007

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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The crisis itself assumed enormous proportions. During 1995, Mexico’s gross
domestic product shrank by 6.9 percent. The implications for the middle and lower
classes were severe. Approximately one third of total Mexico’s businesses went
bankrupt, which caused the Mexican industry to work only at 40 percent of its potential
output capacity. Unemployment rose dramatically, as around two million workers lost
their jobs. Consequently, there was a considerable 29 percent drop in basic nutrition in
the first eighteen months after the devaluation. Even the sound growth of the gross
domestic product in 1996 driven by the export sector that profited from the Peso
devaluation was not capable of offsetting the socio-economic damages caused by the
crisis. This brief set of figures illustrates the graveness of the impact of the crisis on the
Mexican economy and people (Morris and Passe-Smith, 2001 pp. 134-135).
By the means of both examples analyzed in this subsection, it has been
undoubtedly demonstrated that individual countries are vulnerable to the intrinsic
instability of the highly integrated international financial system established in the past
decades. In fact, the general pattern that can be identified follows the common line of
external, unexpected shocks causing the sudden movement of extremely volatile funds,
which ultimately fostered a crisis situation.
However, there is a key difference that needs to be underscored and
emphasized: a weaker economy such as Mexico’s was not able to recover quickly from
the damages and disruption caused by the withdrawal of international capital and the
deriving steep currency collapse. On the contrary, in the medium-term the American
economy managed to respond adequately to the 1987 crash and rapidly regained the path
of economic expansion. At the same time, nevertheless, a number of long-term oriented
matters arose, such as the debatable sustainability of American monetary policy and the
declining role of the US Dollar as a stable and credible international currency, which
posed even more complicated and deeper reaching questions (Alvarez, 2002 p.263). In
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this regard, it seems reasonable to think that more vulnerable countries will seek
mechanisms to protect their economic power more actively than strong ones.
Of course, there are many more cases that illustrate the prevalence of
international financial instability. As a matter of fact, eighty to one hundred countries
have faced a crisis since the mid-1970s (Stiglitz, 1999 pp. 1509-1512). For instance, the
Russian Ruble crisis of 1998 is also aligned to the same pattern. During the 1990s in
Russia, the economic and human consequences of the crisis were devastating. The
industrial production fell by 60 percent, while the GDP dropped by 54 percent (Basu,
2003 pp. 893-894). Such financial disaster occurred because of an unregulated and
drastic change from communism to capitalism coupled with a suddenly increased
exposure to external threats as Russia liberalized and opened up its economy to
international markets. In fact, empirical studies show that the probability of a financial
crisis is particularly high in the five years following capital market liberalization (Stiglitz,
1999 p. 1509). Other cases, such as the collapse of the Turkish Lira, the recent
Argentinean and Brazilian currency crisis provide additional evidence of the argument
that such instability is the result of the current form of the globally integrated financial
system. In this context, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, which will be more
closely examined in the second part of the thesis, can be regarded as a perfect example of
the greatly destabilizing influence of financial globalization (Gilpin, 2001 pp. 3-13). The
liberalizing governments of East Asian nations such as Korea, Thailand and Indonesia
lifted capital controls and so allowed that highly speculative money poured in from
investors seeking new opportunities for high returns. When became clear that market
participants had distorted stock prices beyond their real value, the trend quickly turned to
a negative bias. As a consequence, investment flows fled faster than they had entered,
leaving those nations with deflated currencies, high rates of corporate insolvency, and
worrying socio-economic implications. In the face of these disrupting events, George
Soros, probably the most influential investment banker and speculator in the world,
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revealed his fears of the possibility that more vulnerable countries might opt out of the
capital markets or introduce mechanisms to control capital movements (Alvarez, 2002
pp. 263-264).
Such exceptionally high incidence of financial crises can definitely be
considered as sufficient empirical evidence of the existence of a systemic failure.
Regardless of the various different forms and shapes that a single crisis may assume, the
Nobel-prize laureate Stiglitz uses the following metaphor:
If there is a single accident on a road, one is likely to look for a cause in the
driver, his car, or the whether. But if there are hundreds of accidents at the same bend of
the road, then questions need to be raised concerning the construction of the road itself.
Roads need to be redesigned not for perfect drivers, not for drivers trained to drive on
race tracks, but for ordinary mortals. If average drivers repeatedly find the curves too
difficult to navigate, it is time either to reengineer the design of the road or to impose
regulations on the cars that drive on it (Stiglitz, 1999 p. 1509).
Following the same mindset and adopting a similar parallel, Soros came to
the conclusion that as at an Indianapolis 500 car race, too much speed could have fatal
consequences. In order to cope with this situation, Soros recommended the creation of an
international bank that would bring stability by linking all monetary policies together
(Alvarez, 2002 pp. 261-262). On the other hand, Stiglitz strongly supported the
introduction of measures aimed at stabilizing capital flows. By analogizing with another
metaphor, the author makes the succeeding point:
Without a dam, the melting of the snows at the top of a mountain may give
rise to disastrous floods resulting in death and destruction. A well designed dam will
temper the flow of water, but it will not stop the movement of water from the
mountaintop to the seaside. However, by stabilizing the flow, the dam serves to reduce
and perhaps eliminate the deathly and destructive aspects of the torrent (Stiglitz, 1999 p.
1512).
Besides such self-evident crisis of governance, as has been previously
outlined, the main problem does not merely reside in the prevalence of financial
instability taken in and for itself, but more importantly in the fact that weaker countries
are far more gravely and frequently affected than stronger ones. Stiglitz affirms that in
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the era of globalization money usually flows from less developed to industrialized
countries, i.e. from the South to the North (Stiglitz, 2007 interview). From a rational
point of view, this makes perfect sense, as the opportunities offered in these markets for
investment in funds, stocks, treasury bonds, and other financial instruments are surely
more advanced, secure and profitable. For this simple reason, in fact, resources flow from
poorer to richer regions of the world. Consequently, in addition to the inflow of highly
volatile, speculative capital, this further undermines the financial stability of weaker
economies that loose locally originated capital at their disposal, which are diverted to
other markets, thus increasing their exposure to external forces.
This underlying crucial reality that economically weaker states are far more
severely affected by such uncertainties is essential for a better understanding of the
current and future developments that will shape the governance debate and the
international financial architecture in the coming years and decades.

Power in a Changed Environment

The question of definition of power in the era of globalization is to be dealt
with in the following section. This phenomenon highlights a number of interconnected
developments and events that have eventually generated a set of new conditions (Jones,
1999 p. 357). The environment, in which international relations take place, has changed
substantially over the last few decades. Undeniably, there has been a proliferation in the
number of actors participating in the governance and policy-making process. As a
consequence, this increase of power centers at different levels – domestic, transnational,
and international – has forced the primary player in world politics, i.e. the state, to
constantly adapt to the various challenges it is confronted with. Indeed, when managing
public issues, decision-makers in governments must increasingly take into account the
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interests and agendas of other influential actors, such as NGOs and MNCs. However, it
would be wrong to view multiple centers of power as a threat to the authority of the state
or to assume that the state is in retreat. On the contrary, it has been able to adjust and
retain a decisive role in governance and policy-making by the means of aggregating
interests, making policies, and enforcing rules (Wolfish and Smith, 2002 pp. S51-S52).
Concerning the definition of multiple centers of power, there are two main
approaches: the first stems from a typical realist tradition and is exclusively concerned
with states. In contrast with the Cold War era, it suggests the existence of three or more
powerful countries interacting in the international system. In this context, power is
described as state capabilities and resources employed to pursue its interests. As Nye
points out in simple terms, power is traditionally defined as the ability to effect desired
outcomes, and if necessary, to change the behavior of others to make this happen (Nye,
2004 pp. 4-10). From this conventional perspective, international politics is characterized
by the distribution of capabilities among states as the primary political actors. Kenneth
Waltz goes even further by suggesting that only great powers really matter in the
international system (Wolfish and Smith, 2002 p. S54). Of course, Waltz’s extreme and
old-fashioned view is not accepted here for two reasons: firstly, the thesis acknowledges
the significance of weaker states in the international system; secondly, the existence of
other actors, such as regional organizations, is considered relevant for better
comprehending the dynamics of the interactions taking place between strong and
vulnerable states.
In this context, Nye’s distinction between hard and soft power is viewed as
helpful in understanding the different dimensions of power with regard to international
and transnational politics. According to Nye, the first form of power refers to the
coercive capabilities of a state to achieve desired outcomes through military and
economic means. On the contrary, the latter relies on the appeal of one’s ideas, thus it
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refers to the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion
(Wolfish and Smith, 2002 p. S54).
In connection with Nye’s conceptualization, the second approach to multiple
centers of power adopted here differs from the first, as it explicitly recognizes the
importance of other, non-state actors, e.g. speculators from the formal and informal
private sector contributing to financial instability, while states are still seen as the most
powerful players in the international system. According to the type of actors and their
peculiar objectives, the sources of power may vary greatly, encompassing tangible as
well as intangible capabilities. For instance, it is obvious that in the case of speculators a
large capital accumulation represents the major foundation of their power (Wolfish and
Smith, 2002 pp. S52-S53). Another example for the emergence of a multicentric world
can also be found in the continuing rise and growing role of Asia as a third pillar of the
world economy (Wolfish and Smith, 2002 p. S54). It seems obvious that this approach
raises the complexity of the analysis considerably. For this reason, it is important to
reiterate that the focus of the thesis is mainly directed toward states as the primary actors,
while the others constitute minor, although non-dismissible forces in the international
environment.
In addition and in line with the research question and theoretical framework,
a more classical definition of power will be adopted from a rather moderate realist
perspective. As previously illustrated, realism offers a quite static view of power, as this
is defined as the sum of military, economic, technological, diplomatic and other
capabilities. However, the factor of change related to the distribution of power plays a
critical role within the outlined research puzzle. For the purpose of the thesis, special
consideration is given to the economic dimension of power seen in relative, not simply in
absolute terms among states in the international system (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 p. 64).
As Nye argues, economic power has become more essential in a world of economic

46

globalization because of the relative increase in the costliness of force and because
economic objectives have become more significant (Nye, 2004 pp. 4-10).
Furthermore, economic power can be regarded as crucial and prior to all
other sources of power, as it constitutes the basis for the availability of those resources
needed to achieve predetermined objectives. For instance, foreign policy can only be
practiced, if there are sufficient financial means to project hard or soft power in
international affairs. In this context, one could view the collapse of the Soviet Union as
an economic and financial failure. It can be inferred that economic power lied at the
foundation of Soviet political and military power in international relations, as it allowed
financing an aggressive foreign policy. The sudden collapse of this vital aspect of power
severely affected the remaining constituents of power.
In sum, both strong and weak states as the principal actors as well as other
non-state actors interact in a multicentric world, at the heart of which the economic
dimension of power plays a critical role.

International Regimes and Regional Organizations

While introducing the topic of this section, it needs to be underlined that
since the end of the Second World War the study of regimes has undoubtedly attracted
the attention of many International Relations scholars. According to the prime objective
of their research field, i.e. explaining order in world politics, they aimed at finding
answers that would account for the emergence of rule-based cooperation in the
international system in the form of international regimes in general and regional
organizations in specific. In addition, attempts have been made to determine how these
would affect state behavior as well as to identify the factors that determine their stability
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996 pp. 177-178). For the purpose of the thesis, it
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is regarded as crucial to understand the dynamics of the appearance and strengthening of
regimes, as this will largely contribute to a more complete understanding of the
prevalence and relevance of regionalism.
There are three different theories that have tried to shed light on these
matters:

interest-based

liberalism,

power-based

realism,

and

knowledge-based

cognitivism (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996 p. 178). Since the theoretical
framework utilized here stems from a synthesis of the liberalist and realist tradition, the
latter theory is not considered significant. Before dealing with the two relevant
approaches, there is a need to clarify the meaning of regimes and institutions in the first
place. The most widely accepted definition of international regimes is as follows:
Regimes are implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international
relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of
behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or
proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making
and implementing collective choice (Krasner 1983, p. 2).
On the other hand, this definition has been often criticized, because it offers a
list of various elements that are hard to differentiate conceptually and often overlap in
real world situations (Young, 1986 p. 106). Krasner’s characterization seems fairly
complicated and not precise enough to preclude disputes about the proper description of a
given regime (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997 p. 12). From this perspective and
focusing more on the explicit quality of agreements among states, the consensus
definition can be replaced by a more straightforward formulation with lower controversy
content. This formal approach can be based on the concept of institutions, defined as
persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavior, constrain activities and
shape expectations (Keohane 1993, pp. 26-29). Hence, regimes can be classified as
institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, which pertain to particular
set of issues in international relations (Keohane, 1989 p. 4). In contrast to a broader
behavioral approach, this narrow definition also enables a clear and sharp distinction
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between the concept of regimes and cooperation. In fact, regimes are examples of
cooperative behavior, and facilitate cooperation, but this can also take place in the
absence of established regimes (Haggard and Simmons, 1987, p. 495).
Regimes can be considered as arising, when states acknowledge such formal
agreements as having continuing validity. In this sense, there are two noteworthy
characteristics of regimes with regard to their degree of institutionalism, i.e. the extent to
which they matter in world politics: effectiveness and resilience. The former aspect is
concerned with whether regimes are abided by and achieve their proposed objectives.
The latter feature considers the regimes’ robustness against exogenous challenges
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996 p. 178).
Based on these two important traits of regimes, the liberalist and realist
theories, although they differ in some respects, share their fundamental assumption of
rationalism that portrays states as self-interested, goal-seeking actors, whose behavior is
aimed at maximizing their individual utility in an environment of international anarchy
affecting their interactions (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997 pp. 23-24).
From the start, interest-based models have been very influential in the
academic discourse and have come to represent the mainstream approach to international
regimes. Their main characteristic lies in the emphasis on the role played by regimes in
helping states realize common interests without completely dismissing the impact of
power and its distribution. The existence of common interests in one or more issue-areas
that can be attained only through cooperation is a necessary, but not sufficient condition
for cooperative behavior. In fact, it is argued that regimes help states overcome the
Pareto-inefficiencies caused by the so-called Prisoner’s dilemma resulting from a
situation of non-cooperation or non-compliance with explicitly established rules or
norms. Thus, they serve to individual states as an effective means to achieve higher joint
gains in absolute terms.
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The central difference of power-based realist theories can be identified with
their hypothesis that states are more directly concerned with the relative distribution of
power in the international system. In this sense, as the realist state cares about the
benefits accruing to its competitors, rule-based cooperation is less easily obtained
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996 pp. 183-185, 196).
Within the thesis, a synthesis of both the interest-based and power-based
schools of thought is adopted. In agreement with the double-layered theoretical
framework of this study, it is argued that each theory constitutes a part of the same puzzle
reflecting the reality of international relations. At the macro-level, it is assumed that
powerful states would be more inclined either not to establish or comply with formal
regimes at all or to follow a power-based approach, within which the resulting power
distribution would increase their relative power. The North American Free Trade
Agreement, i.e. NAFTA, is an example of this trend, as the US was willing to enter a
regional trade agreement with Mexico and Canada in order to change the relative
distribution of power in their own favor. On the other hand, weaker countries would most
probably tend to adopt an interest-based stance with regard to their specific regional
integration, or at the micro-level. At the same time, they are affected by the macro-level
circumstances, thus they are willing to use the creation of a regional organization as a
tool to raise their individual leverage in the international system. This tendency is
exemplified by the cases of the EU and ASEAN, which will be discussed later.
It is important to underscore that regimes are distinct from organizations as
they lack the capacity to act; however, they constitute the foundation for the rise of
organizations (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996 p. 179). There are three main
practical arguments that account for the emergence and sharp increase in the number of
regional agreements: firstly, within regions consisting of highly interdependent states,
regimes perform the functions of reducing uncertainty and thus transaction costs for their
members. Secondly, their success in performing these functions raises their value to
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members and creates a demand for their maintenance. Finally, regional organizations
containing a group of rather weak, vulnerable and approximately equally powerful
countries increase the leverage of individual member states in their interactions with third
parties, and most importantly with regional and global hegemons. In sum, high degrees
of interdependence and the success of existing international regimes eventually lead to
their expansion, deepening, and so the formation of regional entities that have the
capacity to act on the international stage (Keohane 1993, pp. 34-38).
The new wave of regionalism that has taken place since the mid-1980s has
had a great significance for the global economy. As Gilpin argues, the reason for the
steep increase in regional agreements can be regarded as a consequence of the failure of
the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-1993) in bringing about a more generalized
global free-market agreements system, which was primarily caused by Europe’s
reluctance and inward turn. As a consequence, many nations joined regional trade
agreements that proliferated in the 1980s and reached the number of almost one hundred
by the late 1990s. Examples of this trend are the Single European Act, NAFTA, the
South American regional bloc of Mercosur, ASEAN, and the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS). At the same time, as Gilpin points out, many
developing countries have started perceiving the advantages of regionalism that would
promote their economic interests while balancing the regionalization in Europe and North
America. This tendency can be considered as a response to an economic version of the
“security dilemma”, in which each regional bloc attempts to strengthen its own position
in the global economy and protect the interests of its members (Gilpin 2000, pp. 40-45).
The following figure shows the growing relevance of regionalism from an
economic perspective. Figure 9 illustrates world merchandise trade and the role of three
regional groupings: the EU, NAFTA, and ASEAN, which dominated trade in the world
economy of 1991. In that year, intra-regional trade accounted for 38 percent, while intraEU trade alone accounted for 24 percent of all such trade. In contrast, trade between
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these three main regional organizations is responsible for merely 10 percent of the total.
This empirical evidence makes a strong case for regionalism against multilateralism as
one of the most influential trends in the recent era of globalization (Michalak and Gibb,
1997 pp. 265-266). Both phenomena are recognized as divergent and competing forms of
international governance in a changed environment. Some analysts reach even further by
making the following straightforward statement:
National governments have responded to globalization by weakening their
commitment to multilateral trade and allied themselves instead into more powerful
regional blocs. Thus regionalism, not globalization has emerged as the alternative path to
achieving the goal of managed free trade (Michalak and Gibb, 1997 p. 265).
Figure 9. World Merchandise Trade

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Michalak and Gibb, 1997 p. 267.

At the same time, if the issue is observed from a different perspective,
regionalism and multilateralism may be considered complementary and non-exclusive
parts of the same system, in which regional organizations act as trade blocs in order to
promote multi-regional and thus multilateral trade. An example of such possibility can be
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provided by the fact that the Mercosur agreement was mainly driven by the interests of
the EU to deal with another regional player in order to simplify negotiations and extend
the benefits to all member states (Stacher, 2007 interview).
In this context, it is definitely significant to note the clear distinction between
the phenomena of regionalization and regionalism that was proposed by Fishlow and
Haggard in 1992. According to their view, regionalization refers merely to the regional
concentration of economic flows. On the contrary, regionalism is defined as a political
process characterized by economic policy cooperation and coordination among member
states of regional organizations (Mansfield and Milner, 1999 p. 591). For this reason and
from the angle of regionalism, intra-regional economic flows are considered critical as
they ultimately strengthen the internal regional economic power of the member countries
by reducing their exposure to external threats such as the instability deriving from
globalization. As showed by table 3, there has been a steady process of increasing the
level of regional economic interdependence since the 1960s as opposed to the wider trend
to multilateral trade. This data provides ample empirical grounds to hold the assumption
that mutual dependence of states within a specific region is higher than otherwise.

Table 3. Intraregional Export divided by Total Export of Each Region

Source: Mansfield and Milner, 1999 p. 599.
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Because of the prevalence of a high degree of interdependence within a
specific region and the fact that non-cooperation could be more detrimental to their
individual power, weak states adopt an interest-based approach to international regimes
at a regional level. They realize the importance of regional stability and are willing to
focus on absolute gains, as non-cooperative behavior would undermine their collection of
benefits. At the same time, because they are concerned with the dangerous instability
deriving from the current international financial architecture and the anarchical structure
of the international system, they are preoccupied with the relative distribution of power
among actors in the broader context including regional and global hegemons. For this
reason, vulnerable states concentrate their economic relations exemplified by trade
statistics within their region also as a protection mechanism against eventual exogenous
shocks. In addition, they use the structure of a regional organization in order to act on the
world stage, increase their individual leverage and so face the challenges posed by
external threats more effectively.
However, the likelihood that a regional organization can bring benefits for all
its members increases particularly, when there is no hegemon within the organization
itself. In this sense, as Joseph Stiglitz argues in a panel discussion on NAFTA in front of
a crowd of academics and students at Science Po in Paris, Mexico has definitely not
gained from regional integration with the US, as money has been flowing from Mexico
to the US in form of increased capital investment and higher imports of American
products. In fact, even though Mexican exports rose after implementing the trade
agreement, its imports of US products had an even stronger growth, thus causing a
worsening of Mexico’s balance of trade with the US economy. As a result, the gap
between the US and Mexico has widened and the little growth achieved in the first
decade of NAFTA has been lower than during the 1960s and 1970s (Stiglitz, 2006
interview). Hence, this form of regionalism is not necessarily favorable for weaker states,
as Mexico has unmistakably experienced a greater degree of vulnerability. In this sense,
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it is interesting to note that the Peso crisis occurred only shortly after the NAFTA
agreement came into effect.
In sum, it can be inferred that in this case regional integration has been
beneficial for the regional hegemon and detrimental for the weaker actor. In other words,
the US gained power both in absolute, but more importantly in relative terms against
Mexico. For this reason, it is maintained as a central pillar of the hypothesis of the thesis
that regional integration makes sense for its members only in the absence of a regional
hegemonic power. This finding will be supported by the evidence from the case studies
of the EU and ASEAN, as will be shown at a later stage.
Finally, within this comprehensive overview, the key elements and concepts
have been examined, which describe the context, within which the research question of
the thesis has been posed. Anarchy, the rise of globalization and the deriving instability
constitute the essential feature of the international environment. In relation to these
developments, power has been defined in clear terms, and special attention has been
granted to the economic dimension of power. Based on the study of international regimes
and organizations, regionalism has been analyzed from a theoretical and empirical point
of view.
In terms of the dynamics of the behavior of states, the following needs to be
remembered: regional common interests and interdependence drive regional cooperation,
which is formalized in regional agreements. At a later stage, these are embedded in the
creation of regional organizations, which possess the ability to act in the international
system and take part in interactions with other actors. Given the prevalent instability and
anarchy in the international environment, it is reasonable for weaker states to engage in
regional agreements and form regional organization that can allow for a substantial
increase in their individual leverage against regional and global hegemons.
In the following chapters, the connection between all the elements presented
so far will be built around the two case studies of the EU and ASEAN. This will be
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useful in combining the theoretical framework and concepts presented in the first part of
the thesis with an empirical case study analysis. The applicability of the theoretical
framework as well as the significance of the main hypothesis of this study will be more
clearly demonstrated.
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PART 2
THE CASE STUDIES
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CHAPTER III
THE CASE OF THE EU

This chapter will entail a study of European regionalism, which will facilitate
a better understanding of the main argument of the thesis. The case of the EU will be
presented and evaluated by the means of a series of different sources and data. Starting
from a historical perspective, the analysis will then be directed toward the objectives of
the EU exemplified by explicit regional agreements and the construction of regional
institutions with the ability to act. At a further step, economic indicators will shed light
on the relevance of European economic regionalism as opposed to a multilateral
approach. Finally, considerations regarding European regionalism in a time of global
instability will be made. Within this part, the crisis of the EMS of the early 1990s will be
overviewed as an example of the external threats deriving from the process of
globalization. Throughout the whole chapter, critical insights into the history, reasons,
dynamics and future of European regionalism will be provided by a number of interviews
with high rank European diplomats and knowledgeable scholars from related fields of
study.

History and Causes of European Regionalism

As has been argued in the first part of the thesis, regional integration depends
on the presence of a certain degree of shared economic, political and other interests,
before plans for its launch can be drawn. In the period of time directly succeeding the end
of the Second World War, regionalism as an institutional form of international
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cooperation had become widely and usually identified with a number of newly developed
security organizations, such as NATO, SEATO, and the Warsaw Pact (Yalem, 1962 pp.
460-466). With respect to such widespread opinion of that time, it is maintained that this
represented a backwards-looking perspective that underestimated the potential for future
developments of simple agreements into more comprehensive institutions, regimes, and
eventually organizations. In an influential forward-looking article written in 1962, Yalem
describes such possibility as follows:
The process of integration is likely to begin with cooperation in relatively
narrow spheres and, where such efforts are successful, to spill over into other areas and
ultimately embrace some form of political union (Yalem, 1962 p. 470).
In the case of European regionalism, it can be easily asserted that this
description is capable of reflecting the dynamics of the rise of regional integration. In
fact, it is widely accepted that the experience deriving from cooperation in the military
realm soon formed a trend toward wider and deeper integration, which first spread into a
fairly specialized sector of economic production with the formation of the European Coal
and Steel Community in 1951. This development helped such tendency to reach even
further to include other areas of economic integration, e.g. creation of a single market
with a common European currency (Yalem, 1962 p. 470).
The emergence of regionalism in Europe includes a variety of aspects and
dimensions that need to be considered. First of all, European leaders realized the need for
a close cooperation with the aim of ending the frequent and bloody wars between
neighbors that had such devastating consequences for the economy and people of Europe
(europa.eu). The solution of the ever-lasting rivalry between Germany and France was a
key point in solving the uncertainty related to European security (Edwards, 2007
interview). Based on the Schuman plan, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
Belgium and Luxembourg signed a treaty to run the heavy industries of coal and steel
under a common management in 1951 (europa.eu). The choice of using the tool of
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economic integration in sectors that are critical for the construction of an effective
military machinery is closely related to the recognition by European statesmen of the
existence of a high interdependence among European countries both in security and
economic terms. As has been accurately explained by the theory of international regimes
and by Yalem, the successful cooperation in the narrow sphere of the coal and steel
industry soon led to its expansion to other areas of economic cooperation. This was
formalized in the foundation of the European Economic Community through the Treaty
of Rome signed in 1957 (europa.eu). Such development clearly demonstrated the
increasing value of regional agreements in Europe and the combination of various issueareas forming a relationship of high mutual dependence among states within a certain
region.
Secondly, the economic circumstances of European states after the disastrous
human and socio-economic consequences of the Second World War considerably
restricted the number of options for shaping the future of the continent. As can be
deduced from a close look at the following table, Western Europe experienced a sharp
decrease in the GDP per capita between 1937 and 1950. It can be argued that such
economic catastrophe played an important role in the decision of European leaders to
begin a process of regional integration. As Yalem points out:
Many Europeans also believe that greater unity will provide compensation
for the weaknesses of individual European states, and so make it possible for the
continent to exert more influence on world politics than would otherwise be possible
(Yalem, 1962 p. 465).
This argument is extremely important for the main hypothesis of the thesis,
as regionalism can be explained at a macro level as a process of integration among
vulnerable countries that realize the potential for greater leverage on world affairs by
uniting their sources of power into one single body. Given the economic situation in the
aftermath of 1945, European states could be seen as weak compared to the firmly
established American and Soviet economic and military power.
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Table 4. GDP per Caput as Percentage of US GDP per Caput

Source: Toniolo, 1998 p. 256.

In addition to this crucial point, it needs to be underlined that some European
politicians and intellectuals advocated the idea of a united Europe in the 1920s and
1930s, a tendency that can even be traced back to the early eighteenth century in the
writings of Giuseppe Mazzini on “Giovine Italia”, i.e. “Young Europe” (Edwards, 2007
interview). However, this represents only part of the story. In fact, directly after the war,
America exerted a great amount of political and economic pressure in pushing European
states to form an effective buffer zone against Soviet penetration (Yalem, 1962 p. 465).
By the means of the Schuman plan and the foundation of the Organization of European
Economic Cooperation in 1947, which included Germany as a full member, the US
encouraged Western Europe to look forward to an era of economic cooperation under
American guidance (Sutcliffe, 1999 p. 187). At the same time, the growth of European
regionalism was also hastened by European leaders’ acknowledgment that Europe
needed to avoid permanent dependence on the US, and so to regain its full economic
potential and independence. This could be achieved by a form of economic union that
would provide the basis for a political union (Yalem, 1962 p. 465). As Edwards
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illustrates, there are official documents in the archives of the British government that
testify the existence of the idea of a “Third Way” or “Third Bloc” as a measure to
counterbalance American and Soviet influence in Europe (Edwards, 2007 interview).
Over the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, a series of important developments in
international politics definitely contributed to strengthening this position. Firstly, the
Korean crisis of the early 1950s and the consequent UN peacekeeping mission can be
considered mainly as an example of American involvement in world affairs, since US
troops constituted the vast majority of the international task force. In this case, the major
European states kept distance from any direct participation (Edwards, 2007 interview).
Secondly, the Suez crisis of 1956 can be regarded as an important event that emphasized
the need for unity in Europe. In fact, the unsuccessful British and French campaign in
defense of their interests in the Middle East in general and their investment in the Suez
Canal in specific demonstrated the weakness of individual European states in the
international system characterized by a newly established distribution of power. The
British confidence with American support proved wrong and the result was the
realization of the failure to play a major role on the world stage. This crisis exemplifies
the growing awareness among European states of the need to unite their tangible and
intangible sources of power under one singe entity (Edwards, 2007 interview). Thirdly,
the Vietnam War was sharply criticized by European leaders who strongly disagreed with
the US administration. The fact that America’s most reliable allies backed off and
refused any involvement in that specific crisis should have been considered as a warning
by the US government that it was making a grave mistake. Even the Britain, the
staunchest US ally, did not support America in that occasion, which signaled the rise of a
different view on foreign policy among European countries (Edwards, 2007 interview).
Finally, later in the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, this tendency was confirmed by
the new German “Ostpolitik” advocated and promoted by the Chancellor Willy Brandt,
which was aimed at improving relations with East Germany, Poland and the Soviet
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Union. Although his policy of rapprochement or “Entspannung” was controversial even
among Europeans, in the end it symbolized a clear rupture between the American and
European way of dealing with the Cold War (Edwards, 2007 interview). These can be
considered as the four main reasons that explain the European decision of adopting a
“Third Way”, through which Europe would regain a central role in world affairs and not
be squeezed by the US and Soviet power.
At the same time, as has been previously highlighted, there were other
motives for Europe to enhance coordination and build a tighter regional integration.
Despite the already discussed European economic vulnerability after 1945, which
fostered a tendency toward economic cooperation, the European economy developed at
remarkably high rates during the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, Germany, France and Italy
grew respectively at an average rate of 6.8, 5.1 and 5.7 percent for the period of time
between 1950 and 1964 (Alford, 1988 p. 14). Meanwhile, the massive exploitation of oil
fields in the Middle East that took place after the War brought about a shift from coal to
oil as the primary energy source in Europe. As a matter of fact, this resulted in an
increase in the consumption of foreign oil from 22 percent in 1955 to 60 percent in 1972
in relation to Europe’s total energy needs. As a consequence, European countries became
exposed to sudden changes in the price of this key commodity (Sutcliffe, 1999 p. 213).
This reflection of the rising global interconnectedness and its inherent instability was
perceived during the 1973-4 oil crisis, which had disruptive effects on the European
economy (Morewood, 1999 pp. 223-224). Because of this critical event, the issue of
financial instability was brought with greater force to the forefront of the debate over
Europe’s future and the alternative measures necessary to offset the related financial
risks. In this sense, it cannot be seen as only a coincidence that the establishment of the
EMS and Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) came into effect in 1979 and was enhanced
in the aftermath of the second wave of oil shocks during the early 1980s.
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While Europe continued to suffer from stagflation and Euro-sclerosis during
the 1970s, the American and Japanese economy seemed to be revived and taking over the
world scene. At the same time, growing competition was also coming from the “tigers”
of Southeast Asia. Therefore, because of a set of multiple reasons European
competitiveness in the global economy was clearly falling behind that of its competitors.
In the end, this difficult situation provided another powerful incentive to the making of a
wider and deeper regional integration (Gilpin, 2000 p. 197). These efforts represented by
the complete removal of all barriers to the free movement of capital, goods, services, and
people within the European Community were incorporated in the Single European Act in
1986, which constituted the basis for the creation of a single European market and
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) culminated in the Treaty of Maastricht on
European Union (EU) in 1992 (Gilpin, 2000 p. 197). The bottom line is highlighted by
the awareness among European leaders over the past few decades that economic power
needed to be protected, since this provided the foundation for an effective foreign policy
enabling Europe to play a decisive role on global matters.
In sum, this important section has touched upon various historical reasons of
different nature that help explain the rise of European regionalism since 1945. At a micro
or regional level, it has been possible to show the ever-growing awareness among
statesmen of the existence of mutual interests and interdependence within Europe as well
as the increasingly valuable function of successful regional agreements starting from a
narrow scope and spilling over to other sectors. On the other hand, from a macro level
perspective, it was demonstrated that external, exogenous events representing a newly
altered distribution of power among the actors in the international system have largely
affected the drive toward regionalism of European states that were not able to compete
with the global hegemons of the US and Soviet Union on an individual basis.
In the following section, the Treaty of Maastricht and its objectives will be
more closely examined in order to illustrate the evolution and shift of European
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regionalism to a more comprehensive political, economic, monetary and security
organization.

Treaty and Objectives of the EU

According to the official website of the EU, the Treaty of Maastricht
represents a new stage in European integration, since it opens the way to political
integration. It creates a union consisting of three pillars: the European Communities,
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and police and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the likelihood of a
German reunification led to a commitment to reinforce the EC’s international position
(europa.eu).
A primary objective of a united Europe has been the creation of a European
monetary and economic union to be reached through three gradual stages. The common
goal behind this proposition was to constitute a protection mechanism against various
threats to the financial stability of the European economy. The EMU would bring the
following benefits for member states: elimination of foreign exchange transactions within
the single European market reducing transaction costs; reducing the uncertainty of
exchange rates; price stability against inflation; strengthening of the EU’s bargaining
power vis-à-vis the US; elimination of the risk of competitive devaluations; reducing the
threat of currency speculative attacks; acceleration of economic and political integration;
encouraging corporate restructuring and creation of large European firms able to compete
against American and Japanese corporations (Gilpin, 2000 pp. 200-205).
As can be easily inferred by this brief list, many of the beneficial effects
deriving from a single monetary policy with the institution of a European Central Bank
(ECB) have a direct or indirect impact on the risks of financial instability caused by the
process of globalization. For example, it will become much more difficult for speculators
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to attack the Euro reserves of the ECB, since an incredibly high amount of capital would
be necessary to undertake such a venture. In addition, the rise of the single currency
could pose a real threat to the role of the US Dollar in the international markets. These
aspects will be more closely analyzed at a later stage.
The second goal is related to the aim of achieving unity in the politically
sensitive realms of foreign and security policy. In fact, this has proven to be much more
complicated to attain, as there might be a potential for serious conflicts of interests
among European powers. However, critical events such as the escalation of violence in
the former Yugoslavia and NATO’s direct involvement in a conflict on European soil led
the members of the EU to agree to create a military arm that would have the capability of
autonomous action, free from the great influence of the US in military and security
affairs (Gilpin, 2000 pp. 201-202).
Thus, with regard to the second objective of the Treaty of Maastricht, it can
be affirmed that external developments, such as American military supremacy and rising
Russian, Chinese, Japanese and Indian military spending might cause the EU to take
further steps to strengthen its relative position within this domain of international
relations. At the same time, nevertheless, it is maintained that economic power lies at the
heart of the international system and constitutes the foundation for an active and effective
foreign and security policy. So, it can be argued that the EU will probably focus on the
economic dimension of power.
In this brief section, the essential goals of the Treaty on European Union have
been presented and shortly discussed with respect to the main hypothesis of the thesis.
However, a closer look at the specifics of economic integration, financial instability and
future prospects of the EU will be taken in the following three sections.
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Economic Indicators of European Integration

It is important to evaluate European integration from the point of view of
economic indicators, since in the first part of the thesis it has been clarified that the
economic dimension of power is especially significant in the context of globalization and
its consequent instability. The interesting question that will be answered is whether
globalization has generated a trend toward concentrating on regional rather than
multilateral trade.
This section will begin with a review of the literature concerning European
economic policy and the challenge posed by European economic regionalism to the
spread of multilateralism. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the general attitude
towards liberalization shifted away from strong protectionist policies and became more
mixed. While the America took the lead in the negotiations for creating a highly
institutionalized system of tariffs on trade, Europe was preoccupied with its
reconstruction and the plan of European integration in order to promote inward stability
and prosperity. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade established in 1947 that
ushered in the institution of International Trade Organization (ITO) and subsequently in
the World Trade Organization (WTO) ensured a multilateral approach to trade
negotiations and enhanced the economic interdependence on a global scale by lowering
trade barriers (White, 2001 p. 59). While European countries have been active members
of such organizations, they continued to negotiate preferential regional and bilateral deals
with former colonies, which brought about the Lomé Agreement in 1975 encompassing a
large number of states in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). This treaty
enabled European countries to enjoy a smoother and freer access to trade and markets on
a multi-regional basis regardless of the WTO rules of multilateral approach against
preferential agreements. A similar development can be seen in the Barcelona declaration
of 1995 that formalized preferential trading ties with a considerable number of
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Mediterranean countries with the goal of the establishment of a free trade zone for 2010
(Aggarwal and Dupont, 2002 pp. 126-129).
From such examples, it appears obvious that Europe’s performance in
promoting multilateral liberalization of trade in the last sixty years can definitely be
considered mixed. European countries have been key actors in the successful building of
the WTO and in the enforcement of its attempts to reduce trade barriers and facilitate free
trade on a global scale; at the same time, nevertheless, Europeans have arranged a
number of preferential agreements on a regional basis and more importantly, European
countries have aggressively protected some of their key sectors such as textile and
agriculture

(Aggarwal and Dupont, 2002 pp. 126-129). In this context, it is useful to

remember that around 40 percent of the EU budget is spent to subsidize farmers all over
Europe, but primarily in France. It seems clear that the policy of broad general trade
liberalization pursued by European countries within the WTO has been counterbalanced
by its preoccupation that the effects of a deeper reduction of trade barriers might
negatively affect European industry and agriculture, thus European economic power
(White, 2001 p. 60).
When the analysis is directed to the inward effects of European integration, it
needs to be stated that the European performance seems to be definitely more positive. A
closer examination of the statistics about the ratio of average merchandise exports and
imports to GDP during 1970-2000 concerning the three member states Denmark, Ireland
and the UK, that joined the EEC in 1973, shows a very interesting reality: the biggest
part of the increases in trade and FDI figures registered in that period of time is intra-EU
and needs to be considered as an economic effect of creating an integrated European free
trade zone. In this sense, one could speak more of Europeanization rather than
globalization in the sense of an intensified economic interdependence within Europe,
since the source of such trade flows has been more related to EU member states rather
than non-EU countries (Ruane and Sutherland, 2002 pp. 212-214).
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The following figure is extremely useful in illustrating the differential growth
of intra-EU compared to extra-EU trade for the period of time between 1973 and 2003. In
must be noted that at the beginning of the 1970s, intra-regional trade was only slightly
higher than external trade. Starting from the mid-1980s and in concomitance with the
birth of the European single market, a clear shift can be recorded signaling the
exponential growth of intra-EU trade versus the slower increase of external trade. As the
time-span used for this analysis encompasses three decades of trade relations, the data
can be considered a reasonably reliable measure for indicating the relevance of a given
trend. This figure provides helpful empirical evidence of the process of regionalism, or
Europeanization in the specific case of the EU. It can be asserted that member states have
concentrated their economic relationships within Europe due to the increased strength
and stability of the internal European market compared to the risks of financial instability
that would arise in the global context.

Figure 10. Intra-EU versus Extra-EU Trade, 1973-2003

Source: OECD
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European Regionalism in a Time of Instability

Despite the critical decision of European countries to raise the level and
importance of intra-EU trade compared to external trade, this merely represents part of
the interrelationship between regionalism and the problem of financial instability. The
monetary issue needs to be considered in this instance, since the risk of a contagious
crisis and negative spillover effects from one country to the other could be estimated high
before the introduction of the single currency. In fact, it is argued that in order to create a
more complete and effective protection mechanism against instability, trade
Europeanization needed a monetary counterpart.
In this section, the crisis of the European Monetary System (EMS) that struck
the British Pound and Italian Lira in the early 1990s and caused their subsequent exit of
the EMS in September 1992 is examined. After five years of exchange rate stability that
endured from 1987 to 1992, the EMS faced the most severe crisis of its fourteen-year
history, in which other currencies besides the Pound and the Lira were also more or less
gravely affected (Eichengreen, Wyplosz, Branson and Dornbusch, 1993 pp. 51-52).
Figure 11 and 12 illustrate the drastic downward movement of the two most impacted
currencies, which helps visualize the extent of the crisis.
The simplest and most popular explanation of this event lies in the view that
it prevalently took place in those countries that were experiencing a continuing decline in
their competitiveness. The empirical data sustains this hypothesis for the Italian case, as
public debt and inflation were high, labor costs were rising, and a declining US Dollar
was undermining Italian merchandise exports. However, this can only account for part of
the reasons (Eichengreen, Wyplosz, Branson and Dornbusch, 1993 p. 59). The main
cause of the crisis can be identified in the complete removal of capital controls that was
implemented in 1990 as part of the Single European Act for the completion of a single
internal market by allowing free movement of capital, goods, services, and people within
70

the EU. Undeniably, controls protected central banks’ reserves from speculative attacks
ranging from taxes on holdings of foreign currency assets to restrictions on the ability of
banks to lend abroad. Indeed, all controls on intra-EC movements of portfolio capital and
FDI as well as commodities were eliminated by July 1, 1990. Furthermore, it became
hardly feasible to restrict the freedom of citizens of one country to open bank accounts in
other countries, such as Germany that was considered the safest financial haven in
Europe (Eichengreen, Wyplosz, Branson and Dornbusch, 1993 pp. 57-58).
As a matter of fact, the only two instruments available to national central
banks to keep the exchange rate of the national currency within the margins given by the
ERM were the following: interest rate policies and direct interventions on the foreign
exchange market. For instance, in a situation, where the French Franc approaches the
lower margin of its specified Deutsche Mark band, the Banque de France had two
different options: it could sell foreign currency on the market by the means of its own
reserves or by borrowing from other sources such as the international capital market and
other central banks; or it might raise short-term interest rates to prevent the Franc from
depreciating further (Zurlinden, 1993 p.43). It seems clear that the capability of monetary
institutions to face speculative currency attacks was greatly reduced by the complete
removal of all capital controls.
Given the emergence of disturbing symptoms in Britain's exchange rate
fluctuations during the first three quarters of 1992, the Bank of England decided to
engage in massive intervention in support of the Pound, reportedly expending as much as
US$ 20 billion, or half of its total foreign exchange reserves of that time. Its discount rate
was also increased; nevertheless, these measures were not sufficient. So, the government
was not able to sustain the currency anymore and was forced to withdraw the sterling
from the ERM on September 16, 1992. Italy followed Britain later on the same day, and
Spain devalued the Peseta by 5 percent (Eichengreen, Wyplosz, Branson and Dornbusch,
1993 pp. 59-60).
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Fears of a contagion through spillover effects to other countries and their
currencies were justified, as it is argued that the French Franc and the Irish Punt came
under attack as a result of the previous British and Italian crises (Eichengreen, Rose, and
Wyplosz, 1996 p. 464). Although the transmission mechanism of a currency crisis from
one country to the other can have multiple channels, one possibility is that a successful
attack on one exchange rate leads to its real depreciation, which enhances the
competitiveness of the country’s merchandise products. As a result, this produces a trade
deficit in the second country of the same region, a gradual decline in the international
reserves of its central bank, and ultimately an attack on its currency (Eichengreen, Rose,
and Wyplosz, 1996 p. 468).

Figure 11. US Dollar to British Pound Exchange Rate, 03.1990-03.1994
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By the means of figure 11 and 12, the rapid substantial downward movement
of the British Pound and the Italian Lira in 1992 becomes easily observable.
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Figure 12. Number of Italian Liras for 1 US Dollar, 1970-2003

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

As a response to such fears of negative consequences on the EMS, the
objective of the Treaty of Maastricht to create a single currency through the three-stage
timetable required to achieve the EMU was not set aside. On the contrary, member
countries realized the need for speeding up the process of monetary integration in order
to avert the correlated risks of the emergence of a similar crisis on a bigger scale. It can
be stated that European leaders developed the awareness of difficulties and possible
bumps in the process of integration. At the same time, they were conscious of the many
benefits accruing from it. Due to the dangerous example of financial instability of 1992,
it does not surprise that the primary goal of the EU in terms of monetary policy is
stability. The mandate of the ECB clearly states that this constitutes its primary objective
(Ryan, 2007 interview).
In this context, the EU is to be considered as an exceptional and
unprecedented kind of entity in the history of formal institutions. Member states have
created one common supranational monetary policy represented by the independent
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mandate of the ECB, but at the same time they have kept national based fiscal policies
within the limits imposed by the Maastricht treaty.
The monetary aspect is certainly one of the most important components of
the process of European economic integration and it possesses the potential to make
major contributions to it. Through the adoption of a single currency, many European
countries have given the best answer possible to currency risks in regional investment
decisions by completely removing them. The choice was strategic, as it further
encouraged economic integration by elimination exchange rate risks within the Euro zone
and lowering the risks of currency crisis. This can be regarded as one of the main reasons
for the higher growth of intra-EU compared to extra-EU trade underscored in figure 10.
As a result, they have achieved more stability and predictability important to the
European business community.

Prospects of European Regionalism

In this section both internal and external potential problems and challenges
will be discussed, which the EU might face in the future on its impervious way to
become a global player. In this realm, the focus will be shifted to the recently renewed
tendency of some EU member states towards a more protectionist posture with some
nationalist nuance and on the affordability of the European welfare system in a time of
global competition, in which the comparative advantage of production costs is definitely
a key factor in attracting international investors. At the same time, attention will be given
to important global economic developments such as the rise of the Euro as an
international currency.
Adam Smith, the father of liberalism, represented the opinion that foreign
trade is advantageous and desirable, when it becomes established naturally as a
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consequence of the economic development of a country. The most important advantages
of trade, in his view, are the access to foreign markets, where surplus products can be
sold, and the chance of acquiring certain goods for lower prices because of comparative
production costs advantage of one country towards the other. The British philosopher did
not promote free trade as the final goal without any reservations; on the contrary, he was
aware of the risks of labor dislocation and massive unemployment that would result from
a hazardous and over-hurried market opening policy. In this sense, Adam Smith
acknowledged some validity to protectionist measures, when the industry is regarded as
crucial to national security and defense and in the case that a tariff on a foreign product
would simply signify a reaction to an equal tax on a domestic product (Rima, 2001 pp.
109-112).
Based on Adam Smith’s moderately permissive attitude, some protectionist
policies can be pursued, either in the case of a country’s defense or as a retaliatory
decision to counterbalance foreign tariffs on domestic products destined for foreign
markets. This explains why anti-dumping protection against unfair trade practices is
widely accepted within the framework of the GATT. Of course, there have been a
number of studies trying to assess the impact of liberal and protectionist policies on the
economy. For instance, a study realized in the late 1990s shows that the total cost of EU
protection can reach a level of around 7 percent of its GDP, which is by itself an
impressive and convincing argument for economic liberalization (Molle, 2001 pp. 434438). An example of this tendency is provided by the EU discrimination against Japanese
goods (Brewin, 1997 pp. 236-238). However, the issue is more complicated, since there
are political reasons involved in the decision-making process that need to be taken into
account. As Gilpin notes, Europe continues to be characterized by individual nationstates and rival nationalities that care mainly about their own economic and political
interests (Gilpin, 2000 p. 226). Among the reasons are the fear of considerable job loss
and the unwillingness of some governments to allow other European companies to be
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involved in a country’s strategic economic realms. The latest disagreement between the
French and the Italian governments over the intention of the Italian energy company Enel
to take over the Belgian Suez controlled by Gaz de France delivers a useful example of
such difficulty. In this context, there is a chance that a protectionist economic policy of a
country, in this case France, might pose obstacles to the higher European project of
creating one single market and consequently making a deeper political integration
necessary to cope with issues of a common economic area. In other words, there is an
explicit need to deal with and solve the problem of rising political and economic
nationalism within the EU (Edwards, 2007 interview).
At this point, the attention will be directed toward the question of
affordability of Europe’s welfare system. It is generally assumed that the European
model of social markets with lower market openness and a more comprehensive welfare
system constitutes an intrinsic weakness that could reduce the European competitiveness
on the global market and in the struggle against the other two models of American stock
market based capitalism and Japanese oriented developmental capitalism.
In this regard, it is common opinion that there is a positive correlation
between the economic performance and the extent of social costs that can be sustained.
Today’s rapid economic growth of emerging economies that are catching up with
industrialized countries could threaten living standards in Europe, as more and more
companies decide to shift their production sites to Asian countries such as China and
India that offer much lower costs of unskilled labor and reasonable infrastructure. This
could lead in turn to higher unemployment and increased welfare state costs in terms of
greater unemployment subsidies. If the phenomenon of the ageing European population
is then taken into consideration, it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that the welfare
system might become unaffordable (Atkinson, 2002 pp. 255-256). European states will
have to take measures in order to cope with such challenges that lie ahead in the near
future: they will need to cut costly subsidies and ineffective expenditures, make the state
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apparatus more efficient as well as put forward good economic policies in order to reduce
the actual unemployment rate and so the need for social transfers.
Despite these difficulties, the Euro is challenging the leadership of the US
Dollar as a reference currency, in the sense that it has become attractive for international
investors and borrowers, which increases Europe’s potential as an even more important
and growing global player (Steinherr, 2002 pp. 151-159). This has occurred partially
because central bankers around the world have viewed the strength of the European
economic and financial system as an opportunity to spread the risks related to their
foreign currency reserves among a few currencies without relying exclusively on the US
Dollar. In 1996, the Dollar accounted for approximately two-thirds of the world’s foreign
exchange reserves, and around 50 percent of international financial transactions. Its
displacement by the Euro would have a dramatic economic impact. By one estimate, the
portfolio switch could be as large as US$ 1 trillion. Some scholars believe that such a
change would entail a major shift in the international balance of economic and political
power (Gilpin, 2000 pp. 223-224).
In addition, Europe surely has the actual means to become a source of
inspiration for developing countries, although not necessarily due to exclusive European
merits, but also because the Washington consensus policies for less developed countries
have largely failed to prove effective and so drawing the attention to Europe as a
successful story. In the future, it is possible to see some countries in Asia, Africa, Latin
America and the Middle East seeking for a deeper regional economic and monetary
cooperation in order to avert the financial and economic risks of globalization (Steinherr,
2002 pp. 159). The experience of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) provides a good example of Europe’s institutional appeal (Viot, 2007
interview). As declared on its official website, ECOWAS, which was founded in 1975,
comprises sixteen nations and its main objective was to achieve economic integration and
shared development so as to form a unified economic zone in West Africa. Later on, the
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scope was increased to include socio-political interactions and mutual development in
related spheres (ecowas.info). The fact that ECOWAS is following the same institutional
setting of the EU and has even adopted a single currency, i.e. the ECO, indicates the
attractiveness of the European model for groups of vulnerable states that intend to realize
common interests and collect absolute gains from regional cooperation, while building a
protection shield from the threats of global financial instability.
It has been argued and pointed out that Europe has a real potential to become
an important global player in the near future. Samuel Huntington pointed out the
following argument:
A cohesive Europe would have the population resources, economic strength,
technology, and actual and potential military strength to be the preeminent power of the
21st century (cited in Nye, 2004 p. 30).
In fact, the size of the European economy is approximately equal to the
American, its population and its share of international trade is even larger, so that Europe
definitely has the economic means and the man-power in order to finance its future
global role. In this sphere, Europe has already reached a point that has enabled it to
challenge the US in different occasions such as in trade negotiations within the WTO,
where Europe enjoys a powerful status equal to that of America (Stacher, 2007
interview). At the same time Europe offers a widely recognized cultural appeal as a
source of soft power that could serve to create a more positive environment for the EU’s
international relations (Nye, 2004 pp. 29-30). Therefore, Europe’s high potential to play
a crucial global role soon could materialize, although the road towards that success will
not be very smooth, as the further development of Europe as a single political entity
seems to be problematic.
Over the past sixty years after the Second World War Europe has been
hesitant to assume more responsibilities in the promotion of a global model of reference,
as it was mainly occupied with the inward economic and political integration, i.e.
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Europeanization and thus it was not ready to play a significant role in the global arena
yet. As developing countries are performing well and catching up with the industrialized
world, this inward attitude of Europe might change because of the likely interest of
growing regions to increase regional economic and political cooperation. Provided that
this occurs, Europe might become an exporter of institutional designs, so that
Europeanization may be the future (Aggarwal and Dupont, 2002 pp. 135-138).
As Nye points out, the central question is whether Europe will develop
enough political unity and consistency to act as one entity on a wide range of
international issues, or whether it will remain a confederation of countries with distinct
national policies and interests (Nye, 2004 p.30). In this sense, European states will have
to work together in order to cope effectively with the challenges and the disequilibria
posed by higher global competition in order to find common grounds for shared
positions.
Given the increased consciousness by countries of global competitiveness
and the high speed of the globalization process, Europe will soon need to update its
institutional framework to the rapidly changing environment, define precisely its interests
and so avoid internal competition and conflicts over trade and markets. For European
countries in order to have a global impact there is definitely only one way to go: a
stronger Europe. Furthermore, from the point of view of economically and politically
more vulnerable European countries, it makes sense to integrate into the EU, as there is
no regional hegemon that would utilize regional regimes and institutions in order to
change the current distribution of power for its benefit. The EU represents an
organization that is qualitatively different from NAFTA in this respect. As Cujovic
points out, there were multiple reasons for Slovenia to join the EU. In addition to obvious
historical and economic reasons, there was definitely the feeling that smaller states would
be considered equal to stronger ones. The EU provided a platform, where Slovenia could
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increase its individual leverage vis-à-vis more powerful players (Cujovic, 2007
interview).
In sum, within this chapter, the main hypothesis of the thesis has been
attested through wide use of a large number of sources, such as historical analysis,
economic indicators, and evaluation of key agreements and their objectives. The position
of European regionalism in a time of global instability has been studied with regard to
political, economic and technological developments. Special attention was dedicated to
the examination of the EMS crisis as an example of the financial risks of globalization
and its effects on European regional integration.
It may be concluded that in the aftermath of 1945 Europe was comprised of
countries that soon realized their weakness in the international system vis-à-vis the global
hegemons of the US and Soviet Union. In addition to the macro level concern of
regaining a significant role in world affairs, which European states decided to achieve by
the means of uniting their power, European statesmen acknowledged the existence of
common interests and mutual economic dependence on a regional basis or at a micro
level. This dimension became even more relevant during the 1980s and 1990s in the
midst of critical political, economic, and technological developments that forced Europe
to accelerate the process of integration in order to decrease its exposure to external
threats deriving from globalization. For this set of reasons, it may be stated that
throughout the whole chapter the usefulness of the selected double-layered theoretical
framework has been widely demonstrated.

80

CHAPTER IV
THE CASE OF ASEAN

This chapter will include a second case study, i.e. a study of Southeast Asian
regionalism, which will further contribute to a better understanding of the main
hypothesis of the thesis. The case of ASEAN will be presented and analyzed by the
means of a number of different sources and data. Starting from a historical perspective,
the analysis will then be directed toward the objectives of ASEAN exemplified by
explicit regional agreements and the formation of respective regional institutions. At a
further step, economic indicators will shed light on the relevance of Southeast Asian
economic regionalism as opposed to a multilateral approach. The historical and economic
perspective of ASEAN is regarded as relevant in order to demonstrate the prevalence and
increase of interdependence among Southeast Asian nations since its foundation. Finally,
considerations regarding Southeast Asian regionalism in a time of global instability will
be provided. Within this part, the Asian financial crisis (AFC) of 1997-1998 will be
overviewed as an example of the external threats deriving from the process of
globalization. Throughout the whole chapter, critical insights into the history, reasons,
dynamics and future of Southeast Asian regionalism will be provided by sessions of
interviews with a representative of the Embassy of Indonesia to Egypt and
knowledgeable scholars from related fields of study.
Prior to a detailed in-depth analysis, it needs to be underlined that special
attention will be paid to the effects of the economic and financial instability in the form
of AFC, which is interpreted as a key event correlated to the opening of space for a more
inclusive, deeper and integrated regional movement. Indeed, it is argued that this
disrupting event has not doomed the stability of ASEAN. Conversely, it has had the
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effect of increasing the regional awareness of the centrality of cooperation among
members in order to deal directly with economic and financial weaknesses shown during
the crisis. As the foreign minister of Indonesia at the time put it:
We have now come to realize because of the crisis how interdependent we
are……we must be able to show the world that we are able to cooperate even more
closely with each other (Haji and Ghoshal, 1999 pp. 759-762).
In the aftermath of the crisis, regionalism gained a clear momentum in
Southeast Asia, as measures for knitting members together more closely were taken and
others such as the idea of a common currency were accurately examined (Haji and
Ghoshal, 1999 pp. 759-762).
Furthermore, ASEAN seems to suit perfectly the focus of analysis of the
thesis, as it is comprised of weaker and more vulnerable states, while no regional or
global hegemon has entered the organization yet. Thus, it will be possible to analyze the
dynamics of regionalism in Southeast Asia from the perspective of the conceptual
framework chosen for the thesis.

History and Causes of Southeast Asian Regionalism

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN is widely regarded as
the most successful case of regionalism outside of Europe (Buszynski, 1998 pp. 555556). It offers a comparable development to the European case, as both regional
organizations have survived the old wave and joined the new wave of regionalism, thus
going through a similar transition from security to economic regionalism. Such shift
reflects the changed global environment after the end of the Cold War and the advent of
deep technological progress. These developments brought about a substantial change in
the priorities for ASEAN, as economic interdependence became to be regarded as the
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engine for further and deeper integration within the region (Buszynski, 1998 pp. 565-570
and 575-577). This view is confirmed by Waskito, a representative of the Embassy of
Indonesia to Egypt, who states that it is true that ASEAN was promoted by the West in
order to confront the Soviet Union. Over time, however, the core and focus of the
regional organization has shifted from security to economic matters (Waskito, 2007
interview).
Founded on 8 August 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was
conceived as a regional response to the threat of the spread of communism. Within the
logic of the Cold War, the cohesion and drive toward more integration was galvanized by
the rise of a united Vietnam in 1975. As Singapore’s Minister of Information and Arts
put it:
Without the Vietnamese threat, it is doubtful that ASEAN would have
become the regional grouping it is today (Buszynski, 1998 p. 555).
It is clear from such statement that the nature and objectives of ASEAN as an
organization changed over time. The security challenge facing Southeast Asian countries
helped them consolidate their diplomatic and political ties, thus laying down the basis for
further development and functions. Because of the end of the Cold War and the
simultaneous virtual victory of the Western model of capitalism over communism, the
international context, in which ASEAN was acting and interacting with other forces, took
a different shape. With the decline of the Soviet ability to project power in other regions
of the world, ASEAN underwent a period of self-redefinition. Thanks to the positive
results achieved in the security realm, members of the organization found it fruitful to
build on the past experience of close cooperation and extend it to the area of economic
integration.
In other words, in the past fifteen years ASEAN has gone through a
transitional phase and a shift from old to new regionalism. The former, as has been
previously described, was mainly related to the issues of economics and security
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interpreted in traditional terms as security among sovereign states as unitary actors. The
latter view of regionalism is outward-looking, non-exclusive and multidimensional in
function. In new regionalism, international and transnational overlapping linkages are
established within the region. In sum, this new form of regionalism responds to the
demands of state as well as non-state actors such as business groups and nongovernmental organizations, whose needs and interests have expanded beyond the
borders of the nation-state (Buszynski, 1998 pp. 555-556). Such definition fits well into
the theoretical framework adopted for this thesis. Indeed, it is argued that countries
within a specific region experience an interrelation of high mutual dependence that
makes it beneficial for them to participate in regional coordination of policies at various
different levels and dimensions. Keohane’s interdependence theory affirming that
cooperation among states is possible at a micro or regional level in the presence of
mutual dependence and interests would explain the shift from the old to the new form of
regionalism.
In this context, the challenge posed to the question of regional cohesion
needs to be taken into account. One could argue that economics knows no regional
loyalties and unilateral decisions of single ASEAN members could thus undermine the
objective of increasing the level of regional integration and eventually lead to a gradual
disempowerment of the organization itself (Buszynski, 1998 pp. 556-557). It is in fact
possible that individual states might look for economic alliances that go beyond the
framework of ASEAN. However, such move does not automatically imply that the
project of knitting members together is threatened. Furthermore, the relatively high
degree of institutionalization of international and transnational relations within the
regional association would deliver strong disincentives against any decision that could
jeopardize the benefits deriving from ASEAN. Any state will evaluate a cost and benefit
analysis of its actions and their consequences on the integrity of ASEAN. Thus, in this
thesis it is maintained that the presence of mutual interests among members and their
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durable institutionalization offer solid sufficient grounds for supporting the opinion that
ASEAN will be able to cope with the challenges originating from the shift toward the
new form of regionalism.

Treaties and Objectives of ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was established in August 1967
in Bangkok by the five original members: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
and Thailand. After a series of enlargements in the 1980s and 1990s, it now comprises
ten countries, among which Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar, Vietnam
have been added to the founding members. The Bangkok Declaration recites as follows:
Mindful of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among
countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing
bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation;
Desiring to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote
regional cooperation in South-East Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership and
thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region;
Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals
of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by fostering
good understanding, good neighborliness and meaningful cooperation among the
countries of the region already bound together by ties of history and culture;
Considering that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary
responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and
ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are
determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or
manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals
and aspirations of their peoples (asean.org).
Within this preamble of ASEAN foundation’s declaration, the key elements
pertaining the main argument and theoretical framework of the thesis can be identified.
In fact, there is a clear reference to the existence of common interests in the region as a
reason for a tighter cooperation at the micro level. At the same time, an explicit remark is
made in relation to the need for economic stability and security from external
interference. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the term “spirit of equality and
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partnership” was included, which indicates the awareness of the absence of a regional
hegemon within the organization.
The ASEAN Declaration includes the following purposes and aims of the
association as well as the necessary institutional arrangements:
§
§

to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the
region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership;
to promote regional peace and stability through abiding by mutual respect for
independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all
member states (aseansec.org).
The fundamental changes occurring in the world during the 1980s and 1990s

encouraged ASEAN to make some important adjustments to the scope and scale of
regional cooperation. Based on the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, signed in Bali,
Indonesia on 24 February 1976, which provided that member states shall cooperate in the
field of trade in order to promote development and growth of production and trade, the
Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPT) for the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA) was deliberated in Singapore, on January 28, 1992
(aseansec.org). Such decision definitely represented the beginning of the expansion of
intra-ASEAN trade rather than adopting a multilateral approach, which is illustrated by
the following extract from the preamble of the agreement:
Recalling that the ASEAN Heads of Government, at their Third Summit
Meeting held in Manila on 13-15 December 1987, declared that Member States shall
strengthen intra-ASEAN economic cooperation to maximize the realization of the
region's potential in trade and development;
Convinced that preferential trading arrangements among ASEAN Member
States will act as a stimulus to the strengthening of national and ASEAN Economic
resilience, and the development of the national economies of Member States by
expanding investment and production opportunities, trade, and foreign exchange
earnings;
Determined to further cooperate in the economic growth of the region by
accelerating the liberalization of intra-ASEAN trade and investment with the objective of
creating the ASEAN Free Trade Area using the Common Effective Preferential Tariff
(CEPT) Scheme (asean.org).
As a result of extraordinary political, economic, and technological events
shaking the very foundation of the international system, ASEAN leaders realized the
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need for further integration and strengthening of intra-ASEAN trade relations. This
clearly reflects the objective outlined in the Declaration of 1967 asserting that ASEAN
should serve as a protection from external threats to internal stability. As the focus
shifted from narrow security to economic matters, the formation of the AFTA can be
explained as a shield mechanism linked to economic instability and external interference.
The agenda of the ASEAN Vision 2020, which was adopted by the members
in 1997, on the 30th anniversary of the foundation of ASEAN, confirms the establishment
of a shared idea for the organization’s position and role in the international system. It is
described as a concert of Southeast Asian nations living in peace, stability and prosperity
in a joint partnership for dynamic development (aseansec.org).
Specifically for the purpose of this thesis, it is important to examine the
Declaration of ASEAN Concord II – or Bali Concord II – signed in Bali, Indonesia on
October 7, 2003. This agreement includes the formal decision of ASEAN leaders to build
the structure of the association around three main pillars: a Security Community, an
Economic Community, and a Socio-Cultural Community (asean.org). Such architecture
can be viewed as a close reminder of the European Union and its institutions, which
served as a model of inspiration. The preamble of the Bali Concord II includes the
following relevant points:
Recognizing that sustainable economic development requires a secure
political environment based on a strong foundation of mutual interests generated by
economic cooperation and political solidarity;
Cognizant of the interdependence of the ASEAN economies and the need for
ASEAN member countries to adopt “Prosper Thy Neighbor” policies in order to ensure
the long-term vibrancy and prosperity of the ASEAN region (asean.org).
It seems apparent that the awareness of the existence of mutual interests and
a strong economic interdependence among on a regional basis has become an essential
recurring feature of any ASEAN formal document. Furthermore, as the official text of
ASEAN Vision 2020 asserts, the Economic Community should be considered as the endgoal of economic integration creating a single market and production base with a free
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flow of goods, services and investment. Its primary goal is to promote an economically
stable and prosperous region generating opportunities for business complementation and
enhancing ASEAN’s competitiveness in the global economy. According to Waskito, the
Economic Community is considered a crucial step toward a deeper integration that might
include the formation of a single currency sometime in the future. Furthermore, he
affirms that one of its primary goals is to tackle the question of how to increase intraASEAN trade. However, there are some difficulties on the road, as many countries have
the same commodities: for example, both Indonesia and Malaysia focus on agriculture
and mining. In this case, ASEAN serves as a platform for exchanging opinions about the
strategy to be adopted and for coordinating policies among member states (Waskito,
2007 interview). This section has been extremely valuable in outlining the importance of
economic interdependence and the widely spread perception among ASEAN statesmen
of the prevalence of common interests at a regional level.

Economic Indicators of Southeast Asian Integration

The ASEAN region has a population of approximately 500 million, a
combined gross domestic product of US$ 700 billion, and a total trade of roughly US$
850 billion (aseansec.org). In this section, economic indicators will be presented and
evaluated as to their explanatory content with regard to regional economic integration
among members.
It can be noticed that the economic cooperation being promoted in the
ASEAN Vision 2020 is comprehensive, i.e. encompassing businesses as diverse as air
travel, agro-based products, automotives, e-commerce, electronics, fisheries, healthcare
and others. The strengthening of the institutional mechanism of ASEAN can be viewed
as a critical aspect of the self-redefinition process of the association. This has been
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partially achieved by the means of the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).
Launched in 1992, this institution was designed to improve the region’s competitive
advantage as a single production unit via the Agreement on the Common Effective
Preferential Tariff (CEPT), i.e. the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers on intraregional trade. Indeed, at the beginning of 2005, tariffs had been completely abolished on
60 percent of the products in the CEPT Inclusion List, while 99 percent showed tariffs of
no more than 5 percent. The current average tariff on goods traded under such
mechanism is about 3.8 percent. ASEAN leaders have reached a consensus on removing
all import duties by 2010 for the founding nations and by 2015 for the new members
(aseansec.org).
The creation of AFTA has had remarkable impacts on the level of economic
interconnectedness among members. It increased efficiency in production and long-term
competitiveness of businesses. More importantly, as a direct result of the creation of
AFTA, trade among ASEAN countries has more than doubled from US$ 44.2 billion in
1993 to US$ 95.2 billion in 2000. In the same year, intra-regional exports accounted for
almost 23.3 percent of total ASEAN exports. Before the financial crisis of 1997-1998,
intra-regional trade had been increasing by 29.6 percent. As illustrated in figure 13, this
was substantially higher than the growth rate of extra-ASEAN exports, which rose by
18.8 percent during the same period (aseansec.org).
These economic indicators are highly valuable for understanding the crucial
role ASEAN has played in fostering regional economic integration since 1992. The
realization of AFTA can be viewed as an important step toward building a cohesive
regional bloc that will be able to receive consideration from economically more powerful
industrialized countries and members of the G8. It goes without saying that in the
absence of such institution it would be extremely difficult for single countries such as
Thailand or Malaysia or others to raise demands and shape the economic architecture of
the global economy in their favor.
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Figure 13. Intra-ASEAN versus Extra-ASEAN Exports, 1993-2000

Source: ASEAN

Figure 13 and the available empirical data indicate a relative increase in the
weight of intra-ASEA trade, although external trade still constitutes the largest part of the
total amount of exports. As Waskito points out, the process of economic regionalism or
regionalization represents the conscious decision of ASEAN leaders to reduce the
exposure to external forces and possible threats (Waskito, 2007 interview). This also
reflects the assumed centrality of economic power in the international system.

The East Asian Financial Crisis and Regionalism

In this crucial section of the chapter, the financial crisis that occurred in the
late 1990s in East Asia will be presented. An analysis will be provided with regard to
causes of the AFC and its dynamics. In this context, economic data and financial graphs
will be made accessible in order to simplify the understanding of the magnitude of the
AFC. Furthermore, its implication and impact on ASEAN will be more closely studied,
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as according to the main hypothesis of the thesis it is argued that financial instability is
connected to the fact that weaker states seek protection mechanisms in order to avert the
risks of globalization in the form of a tighter regional economic cooperation. In following
subsection of the chapter, the prospects, possible future developments, risks and
opportunities for Southeast Asian regionalism will be evaluated. Finally, a brief
comparison of the main characteristics of European and Southeast Asian regionalism will
be drawn and partial conclusions regarding the main argument of the thesis will be put
forward.

The Causes and Dynamics of the Crisis

There are a number of good reasons for investigating into the causes and
looking at the dynamics of the AFC: firstly, it is the sharpest financial crisis to strike the
developing world since the 1982 debt crisis. Secondly, it is the one of the least
anticipated crises in a long time. In fact, in the immediate pre-crisis period, the five most
severely hit economies, i.e. Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, and the
Philippines, had low inflation rates, budgets in surplus and declining government foreign
debt. Thirdly, it is the third-largest economic collapse in the twentieth century after the
1929 crash and the 1973 first oil shock. Finally, it follows the same pattern of financial
crises that arose after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1972 and the
adoption of financial liberalization measures throughout the world during the 1980s and
1990s. As has already been shown, this brought about a skyrocketing effect on the
amount of daily transactions at the main international stock markets increasing from US$
900 million in 1992 to US$ 1.3 billion in 1995. Since much of this money is speculative,
it can move rapidly with sometimes unanticipated consequences (Dittmer, 2000 pp. 3233).
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There has been a lively debate over the real causes of the crisis. Of course,
there is no single reason for the occurrence of such massive financial disruption. On the
contrary, there are a set of motives that can be held responsible. The first symptoms of
disturbances in East Asian economies were the failures of certain large South Korean
conglomerates causing the spread of uncertainty in the markets. In the meantime, in
Thailand, Samprasong Land, a large finance company missed its February deadline for
payment of its foreign debt, which in the end caused its collapse. Following this event,
Finance One, the biggest finance firm of Thailand at that time went bankrupt. At this
point, foreign investors started withdrawing their money from the country and caused a
downward movement of the Thai currency, the Baht, which the central bank could not
sustain for a prolonged time-span. As the foreign reserves shrank, the Thai Baht came
under a speculative attack resulting in its rapid plunge in July 1997 (Dittmer, 2000 pp.
33-35).
It is argued that the hypothesis of “Downfall of Asian Exceptionalism”
endorsed by the IMF, which views financial cronyism and serious weaknesses in the
Asian economies as the prime causes of the rise of the AFC cannot be fully supported.
As a matter of fact, this explanation blaming the Asian capitalist model cannot account
for such regional crisis, because not all countries were equally affected by it.
Furthermore, lack of transparency in the banking system, as advanced by the IMF, cannot
be a reliable risk indicator, as currency crises have also occurred in situations of high
transparency, such as in the Scandinavian economies of the early 1990s (Dittmer, 2000
pp. 36-37).
On the contrary, the AFC can be regarded as a demonstration of the dangers
of financial globalization. Indeed, the proliferation of international funds focusing on
emerging markets in the US in the 1990s resulted in the availability of increasing
amounts of short-term investment capital. According to the World Bank, in 1995, East
Asia received two thirds of total FDI outflows to developing nations, while net capital
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inflow to the five most afflicted countries had grown at an average rate of 20 to 30
percent per year during the period of time from 1992 to 1996 (Dittmer, 2000 p. 39).
Because a considerable portion of this inflow came in the form of highly
liquid and volatile portfolio investment, it was able to take flight just as swiftly when the
crash occurred. Between 1997 and mid-1998, there was a net outflow of US$ 16 billion
accounting for approximately 11 percent of the GDP of the countries involved. In terms
of the value of listed companies’ shares, the market capitalization of Southeast Asia
decreased by around 72 percent from US$ 565 billion in January 1997 to US$ 160 billion
in 1998. As a consequence, the rapid withdrawal of short-term foreign private capital
made it impossible for central bankers to sustain their currencies, which had then to be
allowed to float. At the same time, as the Bank of Thailand announced that it would
allow the Baht to fluctuate, speculators launched an attack that led to a sudden 25 percent
drop of its value. The high degree of uncertainty and panic soon spread around the region
and the negative spillover effects developed a real and full contagion that hit most of the
regional currencies. The most severely hit was the Indonesian Rupiah that lost 83 percent
of its value against the US Dollar by late January 1998 (Dittmer, 2000 pp. 39-40).
In sum, as financial globalization has facilitated the transmission of
information, capital, and other resources across national boundaries, it can be concluded
that it has greatly contributed to the AFC in the following two respects. First, it made it
possible for foreign capital to be invested in Asia in higher quantity and speed. By doing
this, it provided a big portion of the speculative asset bubble. Second, when the bubble
burst, financial globalization allowed a swift and precipitate withdrawal of that capital.
The following figures 14-18 and table 5 help visualize the dynamics of the
crisis and realize the consequences of the abrupt, sudden, and unanticipated shift that
occurred in 1997 in terms of the currency devaluation and collapse in the value of stock
market capitalization. The first aspect is an indicator of the effect of taking out capital
causing a huge wave of selling orders on the foreign exchange market. The second
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directly shows the impact on the value of East Asian companies listed on stock markets
as a measure of disinvestment by investors and portfolio funds. It is clear that financial
market liberalization reforms of the 1980s and 1990s played a key role in amplifying the
consequences of the removal of capital from Asia.
Figure 14. Changes in Stock Market Capitalization, July – December 1997

Source: Federation Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs

Figure 15. Emerging Currencies to the US Dollar, July 1997 – July 1998

Source: Federation Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs
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Table 5 in specific, provides a useful summary of the empirical data
concerning the five most severely affected countries during the AFC. It is apparent that
the effects have been disastrous on these economies; the case of Indonesia is emblematic
with its approximately 80 percent drop in both currency and capital market value. Figure
16-18 illustrated the course of selected exchange rates over a time-span of 27 years.

Table 5. Devaluations and Share Price Collapse, July 1997 – February 1998

Source: Basu, 2003 p. 888

Figure 16. Number of Thai Bahts for 1 US Dollar, 1980-2007

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

95

Figure 17. Number of Singapore Dollars for 1 US Dollar, 1980-2007

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Figure 18. Number of Malaysian Ringgits for 1US Dollar, 1980-2007

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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Thus, it can be maintained that there was a set of causes at the root of the
emergence of the AFC. The effects of unchecked financial liberalization coupled with
massive short-term external debt of both the private sector and the state made the East
Asian economies vulnerable to external speculative attacks. Not enough attention was
paid to limiting the risks of capital volatility and uncontrolled borrowing. As previously
outlined, the crisis had a particularly severe impact on all ASEAN founding members in
real terms exemplified by a declining gross domestic product, a weaker currency, and
reduced purchasing power. Thus, ASEAN as a whole suffered (Haji and Goshal, 1999 p.
760). This is best demonstrated by the stunning decrease in private net capital flows to
economies such as Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines from US$
93.8 billion in 1996 to US$ 69.2 billion in 1998. Such sudden decline caused grave
damages to the socio-economic condition of the ASEAN’s population in the form of
shrinking per capita income and purchasing power as well rising inflation and
unemployment leading to a dramatic increase in poverty (Haji and Goshal, 1999 pp. 764766).

The Implications for Southeast Asian Regionalism

The most evident implication of the AFC has definitely been the internal
redistribution of power among member states. According to Waskito, the respected
position of Indonesia within the organization was largely reduced as an effect of the
crisis, which affected this country more severely than others. Figures 14-15 clearly
indicate the higher intensity of the AFC regarding Indonesia, which diminished its
economic power in relative terms to other ASEAN countries (Waskito, 2007 interview).
Perhaps the single most significant consequence of the AFC has been to
reconfigure the political economic role of the nation-state in East Asia. In fact, insofar as
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the AFC was almost from the start a regional crisis – as opposed a national crisis – it
definitely highlighted the weaknesses of the nation-state in an unprecedented manner.
As Surin Pitsuwan, Thailand’s foreign minister, affirmed at a conference in
Singapore in 1999:
The effects of globalization and the region’s economic and financial crisis
have not only caused outsiders to doubt our efficacy, but also forced us to rethink our
role (cited in Haji and Goshal, 1999 p. 759).
Without question, ASEAN suffered considerably from the crisis, as its
members were facing harsh times. However, instead of becoming irrelevant, the
association gained momentum and began to be seen as a vital protection mechanism
against external vulnerability. As the ASEAN Secretary General Severino declared in a
conference in Singapore in 1999, there were only two alternatives to supporting
regionalism: the first would be domination by more powerful states, while the second
would be a return to nationalism in a divided region. He then observed that the region’s
economic problems encouraged members to cooperate more closely. Ali Alatas, foreign
minister of Indonesia at the time, declared:
We have now come to realize because of the crisis how interdependent we
are, how interconnected our problems are. Now we see that it cannot remain Thailand
only having a problem, it inevitably would infect us. So our problems are interconnected,
our interdependence toward one another has grown, and we realize in times of crisis we
must be able to show the world that we are able to cooperate even more closely with each
other (Haji and Goshal, 1999 p. 761).
There was a strong realization of the need to be more regional because of the
nature of economic problems. We cannot operate any more as individual states (Haji and
Goshal, 1999 pp. 761-762)
Most scholars point out the unique window of opportunity for reform in the
form of increased regional economic cooperation in a situation, where a large number of
countries face similar problems within the same region. There are two points that need to
be underlined in this context. First, although each ASEAN nation possesses its own
peculiarities and specific constellation of difficulties and differing abilities to handle the
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situation, the region as a whole was confronted with similar policy recommendations
ranging from improving transparency in financial transactions, establishment of new
regulatory frameworks, and increasing intra-regional trade. In fact, the very core
characteristic of financial globalization makes it nearly impossible for nation-states to
take effective unilateral actions. Recently, an international panel of experts has urged
ASEAN countries to adopt concerted fiscal and monetary policies (Eliassen and Borve
Monsen, 2001 pp. 127-128).
The second point deals with the effect of AFC on the level of
institutionalization of regional cooperation. The formation of a regional monitoring
mechanism would make it easier for member states to be informed and exert pressure in a
timely fashion in order to cope with eventual threats. The creation of preventive
measures was at the core of the discussions among the ASEAN finance ministers in
December 1997, which resulted in the establishment of the so-called Manila Framework,
by which member countries would undertake mutual surveillance of each others’
economies.
The degree of institutionalization was then further increased, when in
October 1998 the establishment of another joint monitoring system was announced,
which would provide early warning of future economic risks in the region. This
agreement entailed the exchange of information regarding various issues, such as interest
rates, exchange rates, and capital flows. The advantage of regional institutions is that
their function might be facilitated by a sense of regional identity against the pervasive
and penetrative power of the IMF and the West. In this sense, the AFC could be
considered as a “blessing in disguise”, as it forced Southeast Asian nations to foster
closer links and deepen regional integration (Eliassen and Borve Monsen, 2001 pp. 128129).
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Prospects of Southeast Asian Regionalism

The higher level of institutionalization and the remarkable boost experienced
in the aftermath of the AFC might contribute substantially to the further consolidation of
ASEAN as a political and economic entity in the international system. It is therefore
possible to expect this regional association to become even more present in negotiations
over political and economic issues. This tendency is proved by the December 4, 2006
unanimous decision of the United Nations to grant observer status to ASEAN
(aseansec.org). Thus, the prospects for a further development of the roles and functions
fulfilled by ASEAN are positive. However, it is highly debatable whether it will be given
the necessary space to gradually become a supranational organization.
Although the future might look bright, the path is not going to be short of
challenges. There are several threats posed to the nature and integrity of ASEAN that will
need to be addressed. Firstly, since the shift from old to new regionalism, economic
integration has become the driving force. As regional cooperation pushes for greater
openness, this might undermine the specific criteria of regional identity, since additional
business opportunities may arise from broader agreements and the development of
external linkages. In this context, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) could
pose a significant threat to ASEAN, as it is going to be problematic to deal with
economic coalitions that cut across members (Buszynski, 1998 pp. 565-567).
Secondly, the involvement in the Southeast Asian region of global and
regional powers such as the United States of America, Japan, and more importantly
China will necessarily require an adjustment in the bilateral relations with ASEAN. As is
best illustrated by the example of China, more powerful actors will attempt to weaken the
regional association in order to promote their own interests in the region. For instance,
because of Vietnam's membership in ASEAN, its dispute with China over the South
China Sea has become a regional issue. However, due to the importance to some
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countries of their economic ties with China, it will be complicated for ASEAN to reach a
common stance against the regional power and in support of Vietnam. Hence, the
influence of powerful states such as China that attempt to play the role of the regional
hegemon will probably be destabilizing (Buszynski, 1998 pp. 558-560). As Waskito
points out, these regional hegemons will endeavor to offer economic advantages to single
ASEAN countries, thus undermining its cohesion in order to gain individual influence
spheres within the region at the expense of a multilateral approach. An example is
provided by the evident political struggle that arose between Japan and the US, when
ASEAN proposed to set up a regional equivalent to the IMF in late 1997, i.e. an Asian
Monetary Fund (AMF). Japan, which at that time was already studying the feasibility of
a single Asian currency under its guidance, promptly promised to underwrite the fund to
be initially capitalized at US$ 100 billion. But, both China and the US immediately
opposed the idea, which was then abandoned (Dittmer, 2000 p. 45). This type of external
involvement could potentially threaten ASEAN’s unity. However, according to Waskito,
this also poses a positive challenge to ASEAN by encouraging its further internal
development. In fact, he asserts, this regional organization helps single Southeast Asian
nations increase their individual leverage in relations with third parties and hegemons in
particular. As a matter of fact, until now every ASEAN country shares the view that
ASEAN represents the most important organization for their future (Waskito, 2007
interview).
Despite such challenges, the fact that the economic and security community
are both integral parts of ASEAN points out that the association is willing to cooperate
economically with third parties, but that the positive experience of cohesion and mutual
respect since its foundation offers a considerable incentive for keeping the security
structure in a globalized world, in which regional powers might still act in a realist
manner. In this sense, the realist principle of “divide et impera” may be still implemented
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in various occasions, as it is the relative strength of one country in relation to another that
matters to potential regional hegemons.

Comparison between EU and ASEAN

In this brief section, the patterns of European and Southeast Asian
regionalism will be compared with regard to a few essential aspects. The focus will be
merely shifted to those differences that are additional to the ones previously outlined
throughout both chapters III and IV. Meanwhile, the key similarities will be summarized
in the conclusion of the thesis, where an overall evaluation of the case studies and their
relevance will be provided.
The first important difference between the EU and ASEAN deals with the
distinct role that America played in Asia compared to Europe in the aftermath of the
Second World War. In fact, American hegemonic power in Asia was relatively far
greater than in Europe due to the weakness of these former European colonies, and US
policy in Asia did not pursue the principle of multilateralism as it did in Europe. Because
American diplomacy in the Pacific region has mainly been bilateral and not multilateral,
this has made it far more complicated for Asian states for develop broad, interconnecting
and institutionalized regional agreements (Eliassen and Borve Monsen, 2001 p. 125).
A second difference can be identified with the high political heterogeneity of
the ASEAN region. While European countries are all democratic polities, there are more
substantial differences as to the depth of democracy in Southeast Asian nations. This
obviously may constitute a major barrier to the development of institutional economic
cooperation. In addition, this heterogeneity is problematic, when it comes to formal
economic cooperation, as it raises the transaction costs of institution-building (Eliassen
and Borve Monsen, 2001 p. 126). As Waskito underlines, ASEAN is a rather loose
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organization compared to the EU (Waskito, 2007 interview). For this reason, many
authors regard ASEAN more comparable to the EU of the 1970s than to today’s EU.
A third relevant dissimilarity lies in the considerable economic disparity
within ASEAN, which represents the single most important obstacle to formal economic
cooperation. For instance, at the end of the 1990s, there was an enormous divergence in
per capita income among member states ranging from about US$ 1,086 in Indonesia to
US$ 20,400 in Brunei (Eliassen and Borve Monsen, 2001 p. 126).
The final noteworthy point is related to the cultural heterogeneity in the
Pacific region, which also has the potential to increase transaction costs. In fact, within
ASEAN there are six main religions – Buddhism, Taoism, Hinduism, Christianity, Islam,
and Confucianism – while in the EU Christianity can definitely be considered as the
major religion, as the least for the time being (Eliassen and Borve Monsen, 2001 p. 127).
In order to complement the analysis provided so far, this short section has
served to shed light on additional variables that have affected or might influence the
trend toward regionalism. An overall assessment will be delivered in the conclusion.
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CONCLUSION

With regard to the future of regionalism there are three possibilities:
weakening, stabilization, or strengthening. It is argued that basically all three variations
are possible, but the least probable is definitely a weakening of regional integration, since
this would have enormous costs of re-adaptation after having spent time and efforts at
building solid and effective regional institutions. In this sense, a cost and benefit analysis
would probably prove the choice of abandoning a regional bloc as ineffective and more
costly. It is argued that institutions become more valued and relevant, as their duration
increases.
On the contrary, as has been widely and deeply described within the thesis by
the means of the case studies of the EU and ASEAN, the historical data on regional
groupings shows a clear pattern and dynamics toward an enlargement and deepening of
regional integration. It is maintained that the fact that weaker countries seek tighter
regional cooperation as opposed to multilateralism is correlated to the destabilizing
threats deriving from economic and financial globalization. Building on the successful
stories of the EU and ASEAN that have signified many benefits for their members, the
trend has already started spreading around the world generating an astonishing
proliferation of regional agreements. In this context, regional organizations as a platform
for smaller and more vulnerable states to increase their individual leverage need to be
considered as full-fledged players interacting with global, regional hegemons in the
international system.
With respect to the specific challenges of financial globalization and its
inherent dangerous legacies, it is possible to experience the rise of regional currencies.
This would also fit the assumption that economic power has gained great importance in
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international relations, as every actor in the international system attempts to increase its
power in relation to its competitors. From a financial point of view, a world of
international or regional currencies would be more stable and safer for capital mobility.
Long-term interest rates would be expected to decline and become less volatile, thus
making it easier for governments to cut budget deficits and promote growth. Moreover,
this would eliminate currency and maturity mismatches by denominating debts in the
same currency as a firm’s cash flow. The risk of unfavorable devaluations leading to a
payment crisis would be removed. It would also enable countries to take out long-term
loans. Hence, there are many advantages accruing from regional monetary integration.
As a matter of fact, the current system of over one hundred different currencies is
unlikely to be stable or compatible with globalization. As emerging economies will
follow the example of the EU, a scenario of fewer monies will necessarily foster the
establishment of respective monetary institutions. As the IMF was created in a US
Dollar-centric world, such system is unlikely to survive in its present form in a world
dominated by regional currencies (Hausmann, 1999 pp. 76-78). As has been shown by
the example of the AMF, there is evidence that such change is already occurring.
The combination of lower incidence of financial crises in emerging
economies of weaker states and more stability within regional organizations resulting
from the creation of regional currencies would definitely benefit the global economic
system as a whole. For this reason, resistance to a regionalized monetary system will be
abandoned sometime in the future (Dornbusch, 2001 p. 242).
In sum, the great complexity of the topic of the thesis has been tackled by
applying a double-layered theoretical framework consisting of complementary parts to
validate the main argument put forward here. The large amount and variety of data have
enabled the analysis to raise its relevance and its explanatory strength.
In the first part of the thesis, its foundations, structure, modus operandi, and
context have been defined and described by the means of a sufficient set of theoretical
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references and practical examples. On the other hand, in the second part, the focus of the
research has been directed to the study of two case studies and future prospects of
regionalism, while always drawing a connection line between the main argument and
conceptual framework of the thesis, on one side, and the additional empirical information
delivered by the case studies on the other. In particular, within chapter III and IV, an indepth analysis of the rise of regionalism in Europe and Southeast Asia has been provided,
which can be seen as representative cases of a general trend of international political
change. They have been selected because of their high applicability with respect to the
main purpose of the thesis. In each case, a number of sources have been studied and
evaluated. These have encompassed a historical perspective on the causes and dynamics
of regionalism; a closer examination of formal agreements and their objectives; an
evaluation of economic indicators of regional integration illustrated by related charts; and
finally, an assessment of the correlation between financial globalization and regionalism
by the means of the emblematic effects of instability in the form of financial crises. Such
comprehensive methodology has made it possible to gather sufficient empirical data to
support the main hypothesis of the thesis.
Both the EU and ASEAN are to be considered as the most significant
examples of the shift from the old wave of predominantly security-based regionalism to
the new wave of mainly economy-oriented regionalism. After a difficult start, the
respective leaders realized the relevance of common interests and regional
interdependence. Both regional organizations have built upon their successful experience
in the narrow sphere of security matters and have slowly expanded cooperation to other
issue-areas, which confirms the value of the theory of international regimes adopted here.
During a period of substantial political, economic, and technological changes
in the international political economic system in the 1980s and 1990s, both organizations
made the critical decision to concentrate on regional integration rather than embrace a
multilateral approach. It has been clearly demonstrated that the potential threats of
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financial instability originating from the advent of globalization and the higher global
interconnectedness have been closely related to the deepening of political and economic
regional integration in both cases of the EU and ASEAN. In this regard, the economic
dimension of regional cooperation exemplified by intra-regional trade and closer
economic and financial coordination is to be considered as the most significant aspect of
power in the era of globalization. The positive, “regionalist” approach of these regional
organizations to financial crises is a clear demonstration of the primary point of the
thesis: financial instability as a phenomenon linked to regionalism interpreted as a
mechanism to avert eventual risks and dangers for the countries’ economic power.
Within an environment that is characterized by financial instability and is still
dominated by anarchy at the macro level, states that could not exert a considerable
amount of influence on world affairs on an individual basis decide to unite their power
into one single body in order to confront regional and global hegemons and attempt a
systemic change for their benefit.
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APPENDIX I
TARIFF AVERAGES, 1980s-1990s

The following table shows the substantial drop in tariff levels during the last two decades
of the twentieth century. It indicates the general tendency toward more economic
openness starting in the 1980s given critical political, economic, and technological
changes.

Source: Dollar and Kraay, 2004.
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APPENDIX II
INWARD FDI STOCK RANKING, 1990-2002

This table consists of a comprehensive list of countries ranked by the amount of FDI
stock that they receive from abroad. It shows the dominance of the North compared to
the South.

Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003.
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APPENDIX III
OUTWARD FDI STOCK RANKING, 1990-2002

The following table consists of a comprehensive list of countries ranked by the amount of
FDI stock that they invest abroad. It shows the dominance of the North compared to the
South in this regard.

Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003.
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